automatic import of openssh

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2314 deletions

diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 748c4b6..0000000
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2314 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -373,13 +373,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
- #endif
- }
- 
-+int
-+audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- void
--audit_run_command(const char *command)
-+audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
- void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	/* not necessary */
-+}
-+
-+void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- {
- 	/* not implemented */
-@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
- void
- audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
-@@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- 	}
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh * ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	/* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
- #include "log.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- 
- /*
-  * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
-@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@
-  * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
-  */
- extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
- ssh_audit_event_t
-@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
- const char *
- audit_username(void)
- {
--	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
--	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
-+	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)";
- 
--	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
-+	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
- 		return (unknownuser);
--	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
--		return (invaliduser);
- 	return (the_authctxt->user);
- }
- 
-@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- 	return(event_lookup[i].name);
- }
- 
-+void
-+audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
-+{
-+	char *fp;
-+
-+	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
-+		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	free(fp);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
-+{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
-  * Null implementations of audit functions.
-@@ -138,6 +171,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
-+ * audit_session_open.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
-+	      audit_username());
-+}
-+
-+/*
-  * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
-  * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
-  *
-@@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
- /*
-  * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
-  * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  Returns a "handle" for
-+ * audit_end_command.
-  */
--void
--audit_run_command(const char *command)
-+int
-+audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
- {
- 	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
- 	    audit_username(), command);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes.  Note that
-+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.  "handle" should come from
-+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	debug("audit end nopty exec  euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
-+	    audit_username(), command);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
-+ *
-+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
-+ */
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d",
-+		host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(),
-+		fp, rv);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+	debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
-+	       uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
-+	        (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+		geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
- }
- # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
- # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
- 
- #include "loginrec.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- 
- struct ssh;
- 
-@@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- 	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
- 	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
- };
-+
-+enum ssh_audit_kex {
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER,
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC,
-+	SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION
-+};
- typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
- 
-+int	listening_for_clients(void);
-+
- void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void	audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
-+void	audit_count_session_open(void);
- void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
--void	audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
-+void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
-+int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
-+void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
-+void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
-+void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
-+void	audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
-+void	audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos);
-+void	audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
-@@ -33,27 +33,40 @@
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "audit.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+#include "misc.h"      /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
-+#include "servconf.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
- #include "packet.h"
--
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "channels.h"
-+#include "session.h"
-+
-+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern u_int utmp_len;
- const char *audit_username(void);
- 
--int
--linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
--    const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
-+static void
-+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
-+    const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
- {
- 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
- 
- 	if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) {
- 		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
- 		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
--			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
- 		else
--			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
- 	}
--	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
- 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
--	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
- 	saved_errno = errno;
- 	close(audit_fd);
- 
-@@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
- 		rc = 0;
- 	errno = saved_errno;
- 
--	return rc >= 0;
-+	if (rc < 0) {
-+fatal_report:
-+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
-+    const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
-+{
-+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+	static const char *event_name[] = {
-+		"maxtries exceeded",
-+		"root denied",
-+		"success",
-+		"none",
-+		"password",
-+		"challenge-response",
-+		"pubkey",
-+		"hostbased",
-+		"gssapi",
-+		"invalid user",
-+		"nologin",
-+		"connection closed",
-+		"connection abandoned",
-+		"unknown"
-+	};
-+
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else
-+			goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
-+		event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
-+
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
-+	    NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
-+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
-+	saved_errno = errno;
-+	close(audit_fd);
-+	/*
-+	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
-+	 * root user.
-+	 */
-+	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
-+		rc = 0;
-+	errno = saved_errno;
-+	if (rc < 0) {
-+fatal_report:
-+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else
-+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
-+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
-+	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		goto out;
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
-+	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
-+		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
-+out:
-+	saved_errno = errno;
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	errno = saved_errno;
-+	/* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
- }
- 
-+static int user_login_count = 0;
-+
- /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
- 
- void
-@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
- 	/* not implemented */
- }
- 
-+int
-+audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
-+{
-+	if (!user_login_count++)
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- void
--audit_run_command(const char *command)
-+audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
- {
--	/* not implemented */
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+	user_login_count++;
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- {
--	if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL,
--	    li->line, 1) == 0)
--		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+	if (!user_login_count++)
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- {
--	/* not implemented */
-+	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
- }
- 
- void
- audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
- 	switch(event) {
--	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
--	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
- 	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
--	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-+		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
-+			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
-+			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
--	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
-+		if (options.use_pam)
-+			break;
-+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
- 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-+		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
-+			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
-+		break;
-+
-+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-+		if (user_login_count) {
-+			while (user_login_count--)
-+				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
-+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+		}
-+		break;
-+
-+	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
- 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
--		linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
--		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0);
-+		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
-+			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- 		break;
- 	}
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
-+	char *s;
-+	int audit_fd;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		name[what], ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))),
-+		ssh_local_port(ssh));
-+	free(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0)
-+		/* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
-+		return;
-+	audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
-+			buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 0);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress,
-+    char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+	const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
-+	char *s;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs,
-+		(intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
-+		ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ssh_local_port(ssh));
-+	free(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+					 errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			return; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+		else
-+			fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
-+			buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+	char *s;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+		 direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
-+		 ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-+		 (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))),
-+		 ssh_local_port(ssh));
-+	free(s);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+			buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
-+		fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
-+	audit_fd = audit_open();
-+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+			error("cannot open audit");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+			buf, NULL,
-+			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+			NULL, 1);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+		error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
-+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ */
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+struct ssh;
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int n)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.682061561 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -298,9 +298,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
-			authctxt->valid = 0;
- 			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
- 			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
--#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--			PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
--#endif
- 		}
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 		if (options.use_pam)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.656061361 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	authenticated = 0;
- 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
- 	    chost, key)) &&
--	    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
- 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
- 		authenticated = 1;
- 
-@@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done:
- 	return authenticated;
- }
- 
-+int
-+hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig,
-+    size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat,
-+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
-+{
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	audit_key(ssh, 0, &rv, key);
-+#endif
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
- int
- hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.726061899 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		/* test for correct signature */
- 		authenticated = 0;
- 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
--		    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
- 		    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
- 		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
-@@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done:
- 	return authenticated;
- }
- 
-+int
-+user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig,
-+    size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat,
-+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
-+{
-+	int rv;
-+
-+	rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	audit_key(ssh, 1, &rv, key);
-+#endif
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- static int
- match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
-     struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.681061553 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
- 		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
- 		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
- #endif
--#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--		audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
--#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- 		return (NULL);
- 	}
- 	if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.697061676 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_private_by_ty
- int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
- int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
-     u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
-+int	 hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- 
- /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
- const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
-@@ -239,6 +241,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
-     char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
- int	 auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
-     struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
-+int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
-@@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx {
- 	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
- };
- 
--struct sshcipher {
--	char	*name;
--	u_int	block_size;
--	u_int	key_len;
--	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
--	u_int	auth_len;
--	u_int	flags;
--#define CFLAG_CBC		(1<<0)
--#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY	(1<<1)
--#define CFLAG_AESCTR		(1<<2)
--#define CFLAG_NONE		(1<<3)
--#define CFLAG_INTERNAL		CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
--#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
--	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
--#else
--	void	*ignored;
--#endif
--};
--
- static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
-@@ -422,7 +403,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *
- void
- cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
- {
--	if (cc == NULL)
-+	if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
- 		return;
- 	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
- 		chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
-@@ -47,7 +47,25 @@
- #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
- #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
- 
--struct sshcipher;
-+struct sshcipher {
-+	char	*name;
-+	u_int	block_size;
-+	u_int	key_len;
-+	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
-+	u_int	auth_len;
-+	u_int	flags;
-+#define CFLAG_CBC		(1<<0)
-+#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY	(1<<1)
-+#define CFLAG_AESCTR		(1<<2)
-+#define CFLAG_NONE		(1<<3)
-+#define CFLAG_INTERNAL		CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
-+#else
-+	void	*ignored;
-+#endif
-+};
-+
- struct sshcipher_ctx;
- 
- const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.743062030 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-@@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
- }
- 
- static int
--choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
-+choose_enc(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- 
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
-+#endif
- 		return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
-+	}
- 	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
- 		error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name);
- 		free(name);
-@@ -842,8 +847,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- 
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC);
-+#endif
- 		return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
-+	}
- 	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
- 		error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name);
- 		free(name);
-@@ -856,12 +865,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
- }
- 
- static int
--choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
-+choose_comp(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
- {
- 	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
- 
--	if (name == NULL)
-+	if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION);
-+#endif
- 		return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
-+	}
- #ifdef WITH_ZLIB
- 	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
- 		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
-@@ -1002,7 +1015,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		nenc  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
- 		nmac  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
- 		ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
--		if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
-+		if ((r = choose_enc(ssh, &newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
- 		    sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
- 			kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
- 			peer[nenc] = NULL;
-@@ -1017,7 +1030,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			peer[nmac] = NULL;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
--		if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
-+		if ((r = choose_comp(ssh, &newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
- 		    sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
- 			kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
- 			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
-@@ -1040,6 +1053,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
- 		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
- 		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
-+		debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		audit_kex(ssh, mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name);
-+#endif
- 	}
- 	/* XXX need runden? */
- 	kex->we_need = need;
-@@ -1297,6 +1314,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_cha
- }
- #endif
- 
-+static void
-+enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc)
-+{
-+	if (enc == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (enc->key) {
-+		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
-+		free(enc->key);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (enc->iv) {
-+		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->iv_len);
-+		free(enc->iv);
-+	}
-+
-+	memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys)
-+{
-+	if (newkeys == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
-+	mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
-+	memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
-  * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.683061568 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
- int	 kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
- #endif
- 
-+void	newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys);
-+
- int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
- int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
-     struct sshbuf **);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
- 	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
- }
- 
-+void
-+mac_destroy(struct sshmac *mac)
-+{
-+	if (mac == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	if (mac->key) {
-+		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
-+		free(mac->key);
-+	}
-+
-+	memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
-+}
-+
- /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
- #define	MAC_SEP	","
- int
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int	 mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3
- int	 mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
-     const u_char *, size_t);
- void	 mac_clear(struct sshmac *);
-+void	 mac_destroy(struct sshmac *);
- 
- #endif /* SSHMAC_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.731061937 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
- 	kexgssc.o \
- 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
--	sshbuf-io.o
-+	sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o
- 
- SKOBJS=	ssh-sk-client.o
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
-@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
- #include "compat.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sk-api.h"
-@@ -107,6 +108,8 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
- 
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
-+
- /* State exported from the child */
- static struct sshbuf *child_state;
- 
-@@ -157,6 +160,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
- #endif
- 
- static Authctxt *authctxt;
-@@ -215,6 +223,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-@@ -249,6 +261,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
-     {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -1444,8 +1461,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
- 	int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
- 	int encoded_ret;
- 	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
-+	int type = 0;
- 
--	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
-@@ -1454,6 +1473,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
- 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
- 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- 		fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
-+	if (type != key_blobtype)
-+		fatal_f("bad key type");
- 
- 	/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
- 	if (*sigalg == '\0') {
-@@ -1469,14 +1490,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
- 	case MM_USERKEY:
- 		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
- 		auth_method = "publickey";
-+		ret = user_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data,
-+		    datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
- 		break;
- 	case MM_HOSTKEY:
- 		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
- 		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
- 		auth_method = "hostbased";
-+		ret = hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data,
-+		    datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		valid_data = 0;
-+		ret = 0;
- 		break;
- 	}
- 	if (!valid_data)
-@@ -1488,8 +1514,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
- 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
- 
--	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
--	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
-	debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
-	    sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
-	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
-@@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session
- }
- 
- static void
--mm_session_close(Session *s)
-+mm_session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
- {
- 	debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- 		debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
- 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
- 	}
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		debug3_f("command %d", s->command_handle);
-+		session_end_command2(ssh, s);
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	session_unused(s->self);
- }
- 
-@@ -1649,7 +1679,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
- 
-  error:
- 	if (s != NULL)
--		mm_session_close(s);
-+		mm_session_close(ssh, s);
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
- 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
-@@ -1668,7 +1698,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, i
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
- 	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
--		mm_session_close(s);
-+		mm_session_close(ssh, s);
- 	sshbuf_reset(m);
- 	free(tty);
- 	return (0);
-@@ -1690,6 +1720,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
- 		sshpam_cleanup();
- #endif
- 
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
-+
- 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- 		if (errno != EINTR)
- 			exit(1);
-@@ -1736,12 +1768,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh,
- {
- 	char *cmd;
- 	int r;
-+	Session *s;
- 
- 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+
- 	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
--	audit_run_command(cmd);
-+	s = session_new();
-+	if (s == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("error allocating a session");
-+	s->command = cmd;
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	s->command_handle = audit_run_command(ssh, cmd);
-+#endif
-+
-+	sshbuf_reset(m);
-+	sshbuf_put_u32(m, s->self);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
-+
-+	return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	int handle, r;
-+	size_t len;
-+	u_char *cmd = NULL;
-+	Session *s;
-+
-+	debug3_f("entering");
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cmd, &len)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	s = session_by_id(handle);
-+	if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
-+	    strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
-+		fatal_f("invalid handle");
-+	mm_session_close(ssh, s);
- 	free(cmd);
- 	return (0);
- }
-@@ -1813,6 +1880,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh,
- void
- mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- {
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
- 	debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
- 
- 	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-@@ -1820,6 +1888,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct
- 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
- 	    child_state);
- 	debug3_f("GOT new keys");
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	m = sshbuf_new();
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
-+				  MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
-+	mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+#endif
-+
-+	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+		;
-+
- }
- 
- 
-@@ -2111,3 +2192,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ss
- 
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	int what, r;
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &what)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
-+
-+	sshbuf_reset(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	int ctos, r;
-+	char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs;
-+	u_int64_t tmp;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &mac, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &compress, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pfs, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	uid = (pid_t) tmp;
-+
-+	audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid);
-+
-+	free(cipher);
-+	free(mac);
-+	free(compress);
-+	free(pfs);
-+	sshbuf_reset(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	int ctos, r;
-+	u_int64_t tmp;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	uid = (uid_t) tmp;
-+
-+	audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, pid, uid);
-+
-+	sshbuf_reset(m);
-+
-+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
-+{
-+	size_t len, r;
-+	char *fp;
-+	u_int64_t tmp;
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &fp, &len)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	pid = (pid_t) tmp;
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	uid = (uid_t) tmp;
-+
-+	audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
-+
-+	free(fp);
-+	sshbuf_reset(m);
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
--	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123,
-+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124,
- 
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
- 	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con
-  */
- 
- int
--mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
-+mm_sshkey_verify(enum mm_keytype type, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat,
-     struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp)
- {
-@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
- 		*sig_detailsp = NULL;
- 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
--	if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
-@@ -569,6 +570,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+int
-+mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
-+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat,
-+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
-+{
-+	return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
-+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat,
-+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
-+{
-+	return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp);
-+}
-+
- void
- mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
- {
-@@ -921,11 +938,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audi
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- }
- 
--void
--mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
-+int
-+mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *m;
- 	int r;
-+	int handle;
- 
- 	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
- 
-@@ -935,6 +953,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
- 	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
-+
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+
-+	return (handle);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+
-+	debug3_f("entering command %s", command);
-+
-+ 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, handle)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, m);
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- }
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-@@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
- }
- 
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+void
-+mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+
-+ 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, what)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
-+				  m);
-+
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid,
-+		  uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+
-+ 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, cipher)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, (mac ? mac : "<implicit>"))) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, compress)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fps)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
-+				  m);
-+
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+
-+ 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
-+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
-+				  m);
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	int r;
-+	struct sshbuf *m;
-+
-+ 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fp)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
-+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
-+
-+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
-+	sshbuf_free(m);
-+}
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
-@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, st
-     struct sshauthopt **);
- int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
-     const char *, struct sshkey *);
--int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
-+int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- 
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-@@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- #include "audit.h"
- void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
--void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *);
-+void mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int, const char *);
-+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
-+void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
- 
- struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c	2021-04-19 16:48:46.885608837 +0200
-@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "compat.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "cipher.h"
-@@ -506,6 +507,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh
- 	return ssh->state->connection_out;
- }
- 
-+static int
-+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
-+{
-+	return state != NULL &&
-+		(state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string.  The returned
-  * string must not be freed.
-@@ -583,22 +591,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
- {
- 	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
- 	u_int mode;
-+	u_int had_keys = packet_state_has_keys(state);
- 
- 	if (!state->initialized)
- 		return;
- 	state->initialized = 0;
--	if (do_close) {
--		if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
--			close(state->connection_out);
--		} else {
--			close(state->connection_in);
--			close(state->connection_out);
--		}
--	}
- 	sshbuf_free(state->input);
-+	state->input = NULL;
- 	sshbuf_free(state->output);
-+	state->output = NULL;
- 	sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
-+	state->outgoing_packet = NULL;
- 	sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
-+	state->incoming_packet = NULL;
- 	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- 		kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);	/* current keys */
- 		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
-@@ -634,8 +639,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
- #endif	/* WITH_ZLIB */
- 	cipher_free(state->send_context);
- 	cipher_free(state->receive_context);
-+	if (had_keys && state->server_side) {
-+		/* Assuming this is called only from privsep child */
-+		audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX);
-+	}
- 	state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
- 	if (do_close) {
-+		if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
-+			close(state->connection_out);
-+		} else {
-+			close(state->connection_in);
-+			close(state->connection_out);
-+		}
- 		free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
- 		ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
- 		free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
-@@ -892,6 +907,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod
- 		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
- 		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
- 		kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
-+		audit_session_key_free(ssh, mode);
- 		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
- 	}
- 	/* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
-@@ -2173,6 +2189,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	return (void *)ssh->state->output;
- }
- 
-+static void
-+newkeys_destroy_and_free(struct newkeys *newkeys)
-+{
-+	if (newkeys == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	free(newkeys->enc.name);
-+
-+	if (newkeys->mac.enabled) {
-+		mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
-+		free(newkeys->mac.name);
-+	}
-+
-+	free(newkeys->comp.name);
-+
-+	newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
-+	free(newkeys);
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
-+{
-+	if (state == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	cipher_free(state->receive_context);
-+	cipher_free(state->send_context);
-+ 	state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
-+
-+	sshbuf_free(state->input);
-+	state->input = NULL;
-+	sshbuf_free(state->output);
-+	state->output = NULL;
-+	sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
-+	state->outgoing_packet = NULL;
-+	sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
-+	state->incoming_packet = NULL;
-+	if (state->compression_buffer) {
-+		sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
-+		state->compression_buffer = NULL;
-+	}
-+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
-+	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
-+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
-+	state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
-+	mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
-+//	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
-+//	memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, int audit_it, int privsep)
-+{
-+	if (audit_it)
-+		audit_it = packet_state_has_keys(ssh->state);
-+	packet_destroy_state(ssh->state);
-+	if (audit_it) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+		if (privsep)
-+			audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX);
-+		else
-+			audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, MODE_MAX, getpid(), getuid());
-+#endif
-+	}
-+}
-+
- /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
- static int
- ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
-@@ -218,4 +218,5 @@ const u_char	*sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s
- # undef EC_POINT
- #endif
- 
-+void	 packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int);
- #endif				/* PACKET_H */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.722061868 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
-@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
- extern int debug_flag;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern int startup_pipe;
--extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
- extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
- extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
-@@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
- 	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
- 	close(ttyfd);
- 
-+#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) && defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS)
-+	/* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
-+	   compensate.  From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
-+	   ugly. */
-+	if (command != NULL)
-+		audit_count_session_open();
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Enter interactive session. */
- 	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
- 	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
-@@ -736,15 +744,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
- 	    s->self);
- 
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
-+		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
- 	if (command != NULL)
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
-+		s->command = xstrdup(command);
- 	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
- 		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
- 
- 		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
- 			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
-+		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
- 	}
-+	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
-+		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
- #endif
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
-@@ -1550,8 +1562,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
- 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- 
- 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
- 	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
-+	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
-+	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
-+	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
- 
- 	/* Force a password change */
- 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -1763,6 +1778,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
- 	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
- 	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
- 	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
-+#endif
- 	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
- 	sessions_first_unused = id;
- }
-@@ -1843,6 +1861,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
- }
- 
- Session *
-+session_by_id(int id)
-+{
-+	if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
-+		Session *s = &sessions[id];
-+		if (s->used)
-+			return s;
-+	}
-+	debug_f("unknown id %d", id);
-+	session_dump();
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+Session *
- session_by_tty(char *tty)
- {
- 	int i;
-@@ -2450,6 +2481,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se
- 		chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
- }
- 
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+void
-+session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
-+{
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+			audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command);
-+		free(s->command);
-+		s->command = NULL;
-+		s->command_handle = -1;
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+session_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
-+{
-+	if (s->command != NULL) {
-+		if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+			PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command));
-+		free(s->command);
-+		s->command = NULL;
-+		s->command_handle = -1;
-+	}
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- void
- session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
- {
-@@ -2463,6 +2520,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
- 
- 	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- 		session_pty_cleanup(s);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	if (s->command)
-+		session_end_command(ssh, s);
-+#endif
- 	free(s->term);
- 	free(s->display);
- 	free(s->x11_chanids);
-@@ -2537,14 +2598,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh
- }
- 
- void
--session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *))
-+session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(struct ssh *ssh, Session *))
- {
- 	int i;
- 	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
- 		Session *s = &sessions[i];
- 		if (s->used) {
- 			if (closefunc != NULL)
--				closefunc(s);
-+				closefunc(ssh, s);
- 			else
- 				session_close(ssh, s);
- 		}
-@@ -2671,6 +2732,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc
- 	server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+do_cleanup_one_session(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
-+{
-+	session_pty_cleanup2(s);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	session_end_command2(ssh, s);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- void
- do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-@@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
- 	 * or if running in monitor.
- 	 */
- 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
--		session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
-+		session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session);
- }
- 
- /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
-@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session {
- 		char	*name;
- 		char	*val;
- 	} *env;
-+
-+	/* exec */
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	int	command_handle;
-+	char	*command;
-+#endif
- };
- 
- void	 do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
-@@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void	 session_unused(int);
- int	 session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *);
- void	 session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int);
- void	 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
--void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *));
-+void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *));
- void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
-+void	 session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *);
- 
- Session	*session_new(void);
-+Session *session_by_id(int);
- Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
- void	 session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
- void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "auth-options.h"
- #include "version.h"
-@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
- 
- /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
--void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
--void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
-+void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
- static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
- 
- static char *listener_proctitle;
-@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
- 	num_listen_socks = 0;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
-+ * client connection?)
-+ */
-+int listening_for_clients(void)
-+{
-+	return num_listen_socks > 0;
-+}
-+
- static void
- close_startup_pipes(void)
- {
-@@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
-	    ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
- }
-
--/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
-+/*
-+ * Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed.  Careful,
-+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
-+ */
- void
--destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep)
- {
- 	u_int i;
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
- 
-+	pid = getpid();
-+	uid = getuid();
-+#endif
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
-+			char *fp;
-+
-+			if (sshkey_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
-+				fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			else
-+				fp = NULL;
- 			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
-+			if (fp != NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+				if (privsep)
-+					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid));
-+				else
-+					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid);
-+#endif
-+				free(fp);
-+			}
- 		}
--		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
-+		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
-+		    && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
- 			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
- 		}
-@@ -397,20 +434,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
- 
- /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
- void
--demote_sensitive_data(void)
-+demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	struct sshkey *tmp;
- 	u_int i;
- 	int r;
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+	pid_t pid;
-+	uid_t uid;
- 
-+	pid = getpid();
-+	uid = getuid();
-+#endif
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- 		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
-+			char *fp;
-+
-+			if (sshkey_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
-+				fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+			else
-+				fp = NULL;
- 			if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
- 			    sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
- 				fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key",
- 				    sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]));
- 			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- 			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
-+			if (fp != NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
-+#endif
-+				free(fp);
-+			}
- 		}
- 		/* Certs do not need demotion */
- 	}
-@@ -438,7 +493,7 @@ reseed_prngs(void)
- }
- 
- static void
--privsep_preauth_child(void)
-+privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	gid_t gidset[1];
- 
-@@ -453,7 +508,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
- 	reseed_prngs();
- 
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
--	demote_sensitive_data();
-+	demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
-@@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
- 		box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
--	pid = fork();
-+	pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
- 	if (pid == -1) {
- 		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- 	} else if (pid != 0) {
-@@ -537,7 +592,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
- 		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
- 
--		privsep_preauth_child();
-+		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
- 		if (box != NULL)
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-@@ -589,7 +644,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- 		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
--	demote_sensitive_data();
-+	demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
- 
- 	reseed_prngs();
- 
-@@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void)
-  * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
-  */
- static void
--server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
-+server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
- {
-	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
-	int i, j, ret, npfd;
-@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- 			    (int) received_sigterm);
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
- 			close_listen_socks();
- 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
- 				unlink(options.pid_file);
-@@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
--		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
-+		server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
- 
- 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
-+	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1);
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
-+
- 	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
- 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
- 	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
-@@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- void
- cleanup_exit(int i)
- {
-+	static int in_cleanup = 0;
-+	int is_privsep_child;
-+
-+	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
-+	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
-+	   indefinitely. */
-+	if (in_cleanup)
-+		_exit(i);
-+	in_cleanup = 1;
- 	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
- 		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
- 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
-@@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 			}
- 		}
- 	}
-+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
-+	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL)
-+		destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child);
-+	if (the_active_state != NULL)
-+		packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
--	if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
-+	if (the_active_state != NULL &&
-+	    (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
- 		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
- #endif
- 	_exit(i);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
- }
- 
- int
-+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
-+{
-+      switch (k->type) {
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_RSA: {
-+              const BIGNUM *d;
-+              RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
-+              return d != NULL;
-+          }
-+      case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_DSA: {
-+              const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-+              DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
-+              return priv_key != NULL;
-+          }
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_ECDSA:
-+              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-+      case KEY_ED25519:
-+              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
-+      default:
-+              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
-+              return 0;
-+      }
-+}
-+
-+int
- sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
- {
- 	if (k == NULL)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
-@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int		 sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke
- int		 sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
- 
- int	 sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
-+int	 sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);