summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch')
-rw-r--r--backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch2342
1 files changed, 2342 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f68f36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2342 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -373,13 +373,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+ #endif
+ }
+
++int
++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ void
+-audit_run_command(const char *command)
++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
+ {
+ /* not implemented */
+ }
+
+ void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++ /* not necessary */
++}
++
++void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+ /* not implemented */
+@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ /* not implemented */
+ }
+
++int
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
+ void
+ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+@@ -452,4 +471,28 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
+ debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ }
+ }
++
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh * ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+
+ /*
+ * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@
+ * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using.
+ */
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
+ ssh_audit_event_t
+@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
+ const char *
+ audit_username(void)
+ {
+- static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
+- static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
++ static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)";
+
+- if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
++ if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+ return (unknownuser);
+- if (!the_authctxt->valid)
+- return (invaliduser);
+ return (the_authctxt->user);
+ }
+
+@@ -109,6 +113,35 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ return(event_lookup[i].name);
+ }
+
++void
++audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
++{
++ char *fp;
++
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++ if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
++ *rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ free(fp);
++}
++
++void
++audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what));
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
++{
++ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
++{
++ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+ * Null implementations of audit functions.
+@@ -138,6 +171,17 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
+ }
+
+ /*
++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
++ * audit_session_open.
++ */
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
++ audit_username());
++}
++
++/*
+ * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
+ * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+ *
+@@ -172,13 +216,82 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ /*
+ * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for
++ * audit_end_command.
+ */
+-void
+-audit_run_command(const char *command)
++int
++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
+ {
+ debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ audit_username(), command);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that
++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from
++ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
++ */
++void
++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
++{
++ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
++ audit_username(), command);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
++ *
++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
++ */
++int
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s fingerprint %s, result %d",
++ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(),
++ fp, rv);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
++ */
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
++ */
++void
++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
++ uid_t uid)
++{
++ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
++ (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
++ */
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
++ */
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+ }
+ # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+
+ #include "loginrec.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
+
+ struct ssh;
+
+@@ -45,13 +46,32 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */
+ SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+ };
++
++enum ssh_audit_kex {
++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER,
++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC,
++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION
++};
+ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+
++int listening_for_clients(void);
++
+ void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
++void audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+-void audit_run_command(const char *);
++int audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
++void audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
++int audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
++void audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
++void audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
++void audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
++void audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
++void audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *, int ctos);
++void audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
++void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -33,27 +33,40 @@
+
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
++#include "sshkey.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
++#include "servconf.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ #include "packet.h"
+-
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "channels.h"
++#include "session.h"
++
++#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char *audit_username(void);
+
+-int
+-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+- const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
++static void
++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
++ const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+ {
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+
+ if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+- return 0; /* Must prevent login */
++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ close(audit_fd);
+
+@@ -65,9 +78,96 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
+ rc = 0;
+ errno = saved_errno;
+
+- return rc >= 0;
++ if (rc < 0) {
++fatal_report:
++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++ }
++}
++
++static void
++linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
++ const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
++{
++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++ static const char *event_name[] = {
++ "maxtries exceeded",
++ "root denied",
++ "success",
++ "none",
++ "password",
++ "challenge-response",
++ "pubkey",
++ "hostbased",
++ "gssapi",
++ "invalid user",
++ "nologin",
++ "connection closed",
++ "connection abandoned",
++ "unknown"
++ };
++
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ else
++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
++ }
++
++ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
++ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
++
++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
++ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
++ saved_errno = errno;
++ close(audit_fd);
++ /*
++ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
++ * root user.
++ */
++ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
++ rc = 0;
++ errno = saved_errno;
++ if (rc < 0) {
++fatal_report:
++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++ }
++}
++
++int
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ else
++ return 0; /* Must prevent login */
++ }
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ goto out;
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
++ rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++out:
++ saved_errno = errno;
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ errno = saved_errno;
++ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
+ }
+
++static int user_login_count = 0;
++
+ /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+
+ void
+@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+ /* not implemented */
+ }
+
++int
++audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
++{
++ if (!user_login_count++)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ void
+-audit_run_command(const char *command)
++audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
+ {
+- /* not implemented */
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++}
++
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++ user_login_count++;
+ }
+
+ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL,
+- li->line, 1) == 0)
+- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++ if (!user_login_count++)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++ li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++ li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ }
+
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+- /* not implemented */
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++ li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++ li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+
+ void
+ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+ switch(event) {
+- case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ break;
+- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
++ if (options.use_pam)
++ break;
++ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
++ break;
++
++ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
++ if (user_login_count) {
++ while (user_login_count--)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++ "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++ }
++ break;
++
++ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
+ case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ break;
+ default:
+ debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
++
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
++ char *s;
++ int audit_fd;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++ name[what], ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))),
++ ssh_local_port(ssh));
++ free(s);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0)
++ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
++ return;
++ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 0);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++}
++
++const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++
++void
++audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress,
++ char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++ const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
++ char *s;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs,
++ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))), ssh_local_port(ssh));
++ free(s);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ else
++ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
++ }
++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
++#endif
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++ char *s;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
++ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
++ (s = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh))),
++ ssh_local_port(ssh));
++ free(s);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ error("cannot open audit");
++ return;
++ }
++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, 1);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ error("cannot write into audit");
++}
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
++ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ error("cannot open audit");
++ return;
++ }
++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++ buf, NULL,
++ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++ NULL, 1);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ error("cannot write into audit");
++}
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
++/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ */
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++struct ssh;
++
++void
++audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int n)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++}
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.682061561 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -298,9 +298,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ } else {
+ /* Invalid user, fake password information */
+ authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+- PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
+-#endif
+ }
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.656061361 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+ chost, key)) &&
+- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
+ authenticated = 1;
+
+@@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done:
+ return authenticated;
+ }
+
++int
++hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig,
++ size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat,
++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
++{
++ int rv;
++
++ rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_key(ssh, 0, &rv, key);
++#endif
++ return rv;
++}
++
+ /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
+ int
+ hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.726061899 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+ /* test for correct signature */
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
+- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
+ (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
+ ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
+@@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done:
+ return authenticated;
+ }
+
++int
++user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig,
++ size_t slen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat,
++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
++{
++ int rv;
++
++ rv = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_key(ssh, 1, &rv, key);
++#endif
++ return rv;
++}
++
+ static int
+ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+ {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.681061553 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ record_failed_login(ssh, user,
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+ #endif
+-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+- audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
+-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.697061676 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
+
+ char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
+ char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
++int user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+
+ FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+@@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_ty
+ int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
+ int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+ u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
++int hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+
+ /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
+ const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx {
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ };
+
+-struct sshcipher {
+- char *name;
+- u_int block_size;
+- u_int key_len;
+- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
+- u_int auth_len;
+- u_int flags;
+-#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
+-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
+-#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
+-#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
+-#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
+-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
+-#else
+- void *ignored;
+-#endif
+-};
+-
+ static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+@@ -422,7 +403,7 @@ cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *
+ void
+ cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
+ {
+- if (cc == NULL)
++ if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
+ return;
+ if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+ chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -47,7 +47,25 @@
+ #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
+ #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
+
+-struct sshcipher;
++struct sshcipher {
++ char *name;
++ u_int block_size;
++ u_int key_len;
++ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
++ u_int auth_len;
++ u_int flags;
++#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
++#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
++#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
++#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
++#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
++#else
++ void *ignored;
++#endif
++};
++
+ struct sshcipher_ctx;
+
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.743062030 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+@@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ }
+
+ static int
+-choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
++choose_enc(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+ {
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+- if (name == NULL)
++ if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
++#endif
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
++ }
+ if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name);
+ free(name);
+@@ -842,8 +847,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
+ {
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+- if (name == NULL)
++ if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC);
++#endif
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
++ }
+ if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
+ error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name);
+ free(name);
+@@ -856,12 +865,16 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
+ }
+
+ static int
+-choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
++choose_comp(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+ {
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+- if (name == NULL)
++ if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_unsupported(ssh, SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION);
++#endif
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
++ }
+ #ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+ if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+@@ -1002,7 +1015,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
+ nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
+ ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
+- if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
++ if ((r = choose_enc(ssh, &newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
+ sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
+ kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
+ peer[nenc] = NULL;
+@@ -1017,7 +1030,7 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ peer[nmac] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+- if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
++ if ((r = choose_comp(ssh, &newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
+ sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
+ kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
+ peer[ncomp] = NULL;
+@@ -1040,6 +1053,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
+ dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+ dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
++ debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_kex(ssh, mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name);
++#endif
+ }
+ /* XXX need runden? */
+ kex->we_need = need;
+@@ -1297,6 +1314,36 @@ dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_cha
+ }
+ #endif
+
++static void
++enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc)
++{
++ if (enc == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ if (enc->key) {
++ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
++ free(enc->key);
++ }
++
++ if (enc->iv) {
++ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len);
++ free(enc->iv);
++ }
++
++ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
++}
++
++void
++newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys)
++{
++ if (newkeys == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
++ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
++ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
+ * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.683061568 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
+ int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
+ #endif
+
++void newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys);
++
+ int kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
+ int kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
+ struct sshbuf **);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
+ mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+
++void
++mac_destroy(struct sshmac *mac)
++{
++ if (mac == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ if (mac->key) {
++ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
++ free(mac->key);
++ }
++
++ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
++}
++
+ /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
+ #define MAC_SEP ","
+ int
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3
+ int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const u_char *, size_t);
+ void mac_clear(struct sshmac *);
++void mac_destroy(struct sshmac *);
+
+ #endif /* SSHMAC_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.731061937 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ kexgssc.o \
+ sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+- sshbuf-io.o
++ sshbuf-io.o auditstub.o
+
+ SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o
+
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sk-api.h"
+@@ -107,6 +108,8 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
+
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
++
+ /* State exported from the child */
+ static struct sshbuf *child_state;
+
+@@ -157,6 +160,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
++int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+ #endif
+
+ static Authctxt *authctxt;
+@@ -215,6 +223,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+@@ -249,6 +261,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -1444,8 +1461,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+ int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
+ int encoded_ret;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
++ int type = 0;
+
+- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
+@@ -1454,6 +1473,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+ if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+ !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+ fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
++ if (type != key_blobtype)
++ fatal_f("bad key type");
+
+ /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
+ if (*sigalg == '\0') {
+@@ -1469,14 +1490,19 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
+ auth_method = "publickey";
++ ret = user_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data,
++ datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
+ hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+ auth_method = "hostbased";
++ ret = hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, signature, signaturelen, data,
++ datalen, sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
+ break;
+ default:
+ valid_data = 0;
++ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!valid_data)
+@@ -1488,8 +1514,6 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+
+- ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
+- sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
+ debug3_f("%s %s signature %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key),
+ (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
+ (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
+@@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session
+ }
+
+ static void
+-mm_session_close(Session *s)
++mm_session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+ {
+ debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+ }
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (s->command != NULL) {
++ debug3_f("command %d", s->command_handle);
++ session_end_command2(ssh, s);
++ }
++#endif
+ session_unused(s->self);
+ }
+
+@@ -1649,7 +1679,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+
+ error:
+ if (s != NULL)
+- mm_session_close(s);
++ mm_session_close(ssh, s);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+@@ -1668,7 +1698,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, i
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
+ if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
+- mm_session_close(s);
++ mm_session_close(ssh, s);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ free(tty);
+ return (0);
+@@ -1690,6 +1720,8 @@ mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+ #endif
+
++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
++
+ while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ exit(1);
+@@ -1736,12 +1768,47 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh,
+ {
+ char *cmd;
+ int r;
++ Session *s;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++
+ /* sanity check command, if so how? */
+- audit_run_command(cmd);
++ s = session_new();
++ if (s == NULL)
++ fatal_f("error allocating a session");
++ s->command = cmd;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(ssh, cmd);
++#endif
++
++ sshbuf_reset(m);
++ sshbuf_put_u32(m, s->self);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++ int handle, r;
++ size_t len;
++ u_char *cmd = NULL;
++ Session *s;
++
++ debug3_f("entering");
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cmd, &len)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++ s = session_by_id(handle);
++ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
++ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
++ fatal_f("invalid handle");
++ mm_session_close(ssh, s);
+ free(cmd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1813,6 +1880,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh,
+ void
+ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ {
++ struct sshbuf *m;
+ debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
+
+ if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+@@ -1820,6 +1888,19 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
+ child_state);
+ debug3_f("GOT new keys");
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ m = sshbuf_new();
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
++ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
++ sshbuf_free(m);
++#endif
++
++ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++ ;
++
+ }
+
+
+@@ -2111,3 +2192,102 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(struct ssh *ss
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int
++mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++ int what, r;
++
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &what)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++ audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
++
++ sshbuf_reset(m);
++
++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++ int ctos, r;
++ char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs;
++ u_int64_t tmp;
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
++
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &mac, NULL)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &compress, NULL)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pfs, NULL)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++ pid = (pid_t) tmp;
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++ uid = (pid_t) tmp;
++
++ audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid);
++
++ free(cipher);
++ free(mac);
++ free(compress);
++ free(pfs);
++ sshbuf_reset(m);
++
++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++ int ctos, r;
++ u_int64_t tmp;
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
++
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ctos)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++ pid = (pid_t) tmp;
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++ uid = (uid_t) tmp;
++
++ audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, pid, uid);
++
++ sshbuf_reset(m);
++
++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
++{
++ size_t len, r;
++ char *fp;
++ u_int64_t tmp;
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
++
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &fp, &len)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++ pid = (pid_t) tmp;
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &tmp)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++ uid = (uid_t) tmp;
++
++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
++
++ free(fp);
++ sshbuf_reset(m);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124,
+
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con
+ */
+
+ int
+-mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
++mm_sshkey_verify(enum mm_keytype type, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp)
+ {
+@@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
+ *sig_detailsp = NULL;
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+- if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
+@@ -569,6 +570,22 @@ mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *ke
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++int
++mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
++ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat,
++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
++{
++ return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp);
++}
++
++int
++mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
++ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *pkalg, u_int compat,
++ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
++{
++ return mm_sshkey_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen, pkalg, compat, detailsp);
++}
++
+ void
+ mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
+ {
+@@ -921,11 +938,12 @@ mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audi
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
+
+-void
+-mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
++int
++mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *command)
+ {
+ struct sshbuf *m;
+ int r;
++ int handle;
+
+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+@@ -935,6 +953,30 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
++
++ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &handle)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++ sshbuf_free(m);
++
++ return (handle);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
++{
++ int r;
++ struct sshbuf *m;
++
++ debug3_f("entering command %s", command);
++
++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, handle)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, m);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+@@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
+ }
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++void
++mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
++{
++ int r;
++ struct sshbuf *m;
++
++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, what)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
++ m);
++
++ sshbuf_free(m);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid,
++ uid_t uid)
++{
++ int r;
++ struct sshbuf *m;
++
++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, cipher)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, (mac ? mac : "<implicit>"))) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, compress)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fps)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
++ m);
++
++ sshbuf_free(m);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ int r;
++ struct sshbuf *m;
++
++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ctos)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
++ m);
++ sshbuf_free(m);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ int r;
++ struct sshbuf *m;
++
++ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
++ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, fp)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, pid)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, uid)) != 0)
++ fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m);
++ sshbuf_free(m);
++}
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, st
+ struct sshauthopt **);
+ int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, struct sshkey *);
+-int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++int mm_hostbased_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
++int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+@@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ #include "audit.h"
+ void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
+-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
++int mm_audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const char *);
++void mm_audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int, const char *);
++void mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *, int);
++void mm_audit_kex_body(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(struct ssh *, int, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c 2021-04-19 16:48:46.885608837 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
+ #endif
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "cipher.h"
+@@ -506,6 +507,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh
+ return ssh->state->connection_out;
+ }
+
++static int
++packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
++{
++ return state != NULL &&
++ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+@@ -583,22 +591,19 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
+ {
+ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+ u_int mode;
++ u_int had_keys = packet_state_has_keys(state);
+
+ if (!state->initialized)
+ return;
+ state->initialized = 0;
+- if (do_close) {
+- if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
+- close(state->connection_out);
+- } else {
+- close(state->connection_in);
+- close(state->connection_out);
+- }
+- }
+ sshbuf_free(state->input);
++ state->input = NULL;
+ sshbuf_free(state->output);
++ state->output = NULL;
+ sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
++ state->outgoing_packet = NULL;
+ sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
++ state->incoming_packet = NULL;
+ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+ kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */
+ state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+@@ -634,8 +639,18 @@ ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ss
+ #endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
+ cipher_free(state->send_context);
+ cipher_free(state->receive_context);
++ if (had_keys && state->server_side) {
++ /* Assuming this is called only from privsep child */
++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX);
++ }
+ state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
+ if (do_close) {
++ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
++ close(state->connection_out);
++ } else {
++ close(state->connection_in);
++ close(state->connection_out);
++ }
+ free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
+ ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
+ free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
+@@ -892,6 +907,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
+ (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
+ kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, mode);
+ state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+ }
+ /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
+@@ -2173,6 +2189,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
+ return (void *)ssh->state->output;
+ }
+
++static void
++newkeys_destroy_and_free(struct newkeys *newkeys)
++{
++ if (newkeys == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ free(newkeys->enc.name);
++
++ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) {
++ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
++ free(newkeys->mac.name);
++ }
++
++ free(newkeys->comp.name);
++
++ newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
++ free(newkeys);
++}
++
++static void
++packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
++{
++ if (state == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ cipher_free(state->receive_context);
++ cipher_free(state->send_context);
++ state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
++
++ sshbuf_free(state->input);
++ state->input = NULL;
++ sshbuf_free(state->output);
++ state->output = NULL;
++ sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
++ state->outgoing_packet = NULL;
++ sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
++ state->incoming_packet = NULL;
++ if (state->compression_buffer) {
++ sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
++ state->compression_buffer = NULL;
++ }
++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
++ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
++ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
++ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
++// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
++// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
++}
++
++void
++packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, int audit_it, int privsep)
++{
++ if (audit_it)
++ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys(ssh->state);
++ packet_destroy_state(ssh->state);
++ if (audit_it) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (privsep)
++ audit_session_key_free(ssh, MODE_MAX);
++ else
++ audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, MODE_MAX, getpid(), getuid());
++#endif
++ }
++}
++
+ /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
+ static int
+ ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -218,4 +218,5 @@ const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s
+ # undef EC_POINT
+ #endif
+
++void packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int);
+ #endif /* PACKET_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.722061868 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
+ extern int debug_flag;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ extern int startup_pipe;
+-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
+ extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
+ extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
+@@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
+ /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ttyfd);
+
++#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) && defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS)
++ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
++ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
++ ugly. */
++ if (command != NULL)
++ audit_count_session_open();
++#endif
++
+ /* Enter interactive session. */
+ s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
+@@ -736,15 +744,19 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
+ s->self);
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
++ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
+ if (command != NULL)
+- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
++ s->command = xstrdup(command);
+ else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+ char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+ if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+ shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
++ s->command = xstrdup(shell);
+ }
++ if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
++ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ #endif
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
+@@ -1550,8 +1562,11 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
+ sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+
+ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+- destroy_sensitive_data();
++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+ ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
++ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
++ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
++ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 0, 1);
+
+ /* Force a password change */
+ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+@@ -1763,6 +1778,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
+ sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
+ sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
+ sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
++#endif
+ sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
+ sessions_first_unused = id;
+ }
+@@ -1843,6 +1861,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
+ }
+
+ Session *
++session_by_id(int id)
++{
++ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
++ Session *s = &sessions[id];
++ if (s->used)
++ return s;
++ }
++ debug_f("unknown id %d", id);
++ session_dump();
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++Session *
+ session_by_tty(char *tty)
+ {
+ int i;
+@@ -2450,6 +2481,32 @@ session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Se
+ chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
+ }
+
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++void
++session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
++{
++ if (s->command != NULL) {
++ if (s->command_handle != -1)
++ audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command);
++ free(s->command);
++ s->command = NULL;
++ s->command_handle = -1;
++ }
++}
++
++static void
++session_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
++{
++ if (s->command != NULL) {
++ if (s->command_handle != -1)
++ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command));
++ free(s->command);
++ s->command = NULL;
++ s->command_handle = -1;
++ }
++}
++#endif
++
+ void
+ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+ {
+@@ -2463,6 +2520,10 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (s->command)
++ session_end_command(ssh, s);
++#endif
+ free(s->term);
+ free(s->display);
+ free(s->x11_chanids);
+@@ -2537,14 +2598,14 @@ session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh
+ }
+
+ void
+-session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *))
++session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(struct ssh *ssh, Session *))
+ {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used) {
+ if (closefunc != NULL)
+- closefunc(s);
++ closefunc(ssh, s);
+ else
+ session_close(ssh, s);
+ }
+@@ -2671,6 +2732,15 @@ do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authc
+ server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
+ }
+
++static void
++do_cleanup_one_session(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
++{
++ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ session_end_command2(ssh, s);
++#endif
++}
++
+ void
+ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+@@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
+ * or if running in monitor.
+ */
+ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+- session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
++ session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session);
+ }
+
+ /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session {
+ char *name;
+ char *val;
+ } *env;
++
++ /* exec */
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ int command_handle;
++ char *command;
++#endif
+ };
+
+ void do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
+@@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void session_unused(int);
+ int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *);
+ void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int);
+ void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *);
+-void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *));
++void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *));
+ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
++void session_end_command2(struct ssh *ssh, Session *);
+
+ Session *session_new(void);
++Session *session_by_id(int);
+ Session *session_by_tty(char *);
+ void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
+ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+
+ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+-void demote_sensitive_data(void);
++void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
++void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
+ static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+
+ static char *listener_proctitle;
+@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
+ num_listen_socks = -1;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
++ * client connection?)
++ */
++int listening_for_clients(void)
++{
++ return num_listen_socks >= 0;
++}
++
+ static void
+ close_startup_pipes(void)
+ {
+@@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+ }
+ }
+
+-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
++/*
++ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful,
++ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
++ */
+ void
+-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
++destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep)
+ {
+ u_int i;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
+
++ pid = getpid();
++ uid = getuid();
++#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
++ char *fp;
++
++ if (sshkey_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++ else
++ fp = NULL;
+ sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
++ if (fp != NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (privsep)
++ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
++ pid, uid));
++ else
++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
++ pid, uid);
++#endif
++ free(fp);
++ }
+ }
+- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
++ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
++ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+ }
+@@ -397,20 +434,38 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+
+ /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+ void
+-demote_sensitive_data(void)
++demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ struct sshkey *tmp;
+ u_int i;
+ int r;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
+
++ pid = getpid();
++ uid = getuid();
++#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
++ char *fp;
++
++ if (sshkey_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++ else
++ fp = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key",
+ sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]));
+ sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
++ if (fp != NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
++#endif
++ free(fp);
++ }
+ }
+ /* Certs do not need demotion */
+ }
+@@ -438,7 +493,7 @@ reseed_prngs(void)
+ }
+
+ static void
+-privsep_preauth_child(void)
++privsep_preauth_child(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ gid_t gidset[1];
+
+@@ -453,7 +508,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+ reseed_prngs();
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+- demote_sensitive_data();
++ demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
+@@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+
+ if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
+ box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
+- pid = fork();
++ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ } else if (pid != 0) {
+@@ -537,7 +592,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+ /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+
+- privsep_preauth_child();
++ privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
+ setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+ if (box != NULL)
+ ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+@@ -589,7 +644,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+- demote_sensitive_data();
++ demote_sensitive_data(ssh);
+
+ reseed_prngs();
+
+@@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void)
+ * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
+ */
+ static void
+-server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
++server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+ {
+ fd_set *fdset;
+ int i, j, ret, maxfd;
+@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ (int) received_sigterm);
++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
+ close_listen_socks();
+ if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ unlink(options.pid_file);
+@@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+
+ /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+- server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
++ server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out,
+ &newsock, config_s);
+ }
+
+@@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
+
+ /* The connection has been terminated. */
++ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1);
++ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
++
+ ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
+ verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
+ (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
+@@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ void
+ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ {
++ static int in_cleanup = 0;
++ int is_privsep_child;
++
++ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
++ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse
++ indefinitely. */
++ if (in_cleanup)
++ _exit(i);
++ in_cleanup = 1;
+ if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
+ do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
+ if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
+@@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ }
+ }
+ }
++ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
++ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL)
++ destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child);
++ if (the_active_state != NULL)
++ packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+- if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
++ if (the_active_state != NULL &&
++ (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
++ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+ audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+ #endif
+ _exit(i);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
+ }
+
+ int
++sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
++{
++ switch (k->type) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
++ case KEY_RSA: {
++ const BIGNUM *d;
++ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
++ return d != NULL;
++ }
++ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
++ case KEY_DSA: {
++ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
++ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
++ return priv_key != NULL;
++ }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
++ case KEY_ECDSA:
++ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++ case KEY_ED25519:
++ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
++ default:
++ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
++ return 0;
++ }
++}
++
++int
+ sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
+ {
+ if (k == NULL)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.741062014 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
+Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke
+ int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
+
+ int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
++int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *);
+ int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
+ int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
+ int sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-06-29 18:40:58 +0000