From 32ebaa0dbca5d0bb86e384e72bebc153f48413e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "djm@openbsd.org" Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 11:18:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] upstream: avoid integer overflow of auth attempts (harmless,caught by monitor) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 488ad570b003b21e0cd9e7a00349cfc1003b4d86 Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/32ebaa0dbca5d0 Conflict:NA --- auth2.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c index 7290d54..0de58e6 100644 --- a/auth2.c +++ b/auth2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.161 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.164 2022/02/23 11:18:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -290,6 +290,8 @@ if (options.check_user_splash) if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) *style++ = 0; + if (authctxt->attempt >= 1024) + auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh); if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) { /* setup auth context */ authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user)); @@ -298,6 +300,7 @@ if (options.check_user_splash) authctxt->valid = 1; debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user); } else { + authctxt->valid = 0; /* Invalid user, fake password information */ authctxt->pw = fakepw(); } -- 2.23.0