%global _empty_manifest_terminate_build 0 Name: python-evalidate Version: 1.0.2 Release: 1 Summary: Validation and secure evaluation of untrusted python expressions License: MIT URL: http://github.com/yaroslaff/evalidate Source0: https://mirrors.nju.edu.cn/pypi/web/packages/a8/d1/c2988bc432070280af5453cb65849c6b9689ba032fab0d4fc1b3b0a87997/evalidate-1.0.2.tar.gz BuildArch: noarch %description # Evalidate Evalidate is simple python module for safe eval()'uating user-supplied (possible malicious) logical expressions in python syntax. ## Purpose Originally it's developed for filtering (performing boolean expressions) complex data structures e.g. find employees: ```python person.age>30 and person.salary>5000 or "Jack" in person.children ``` Or find cheap smartphones: ```python category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0 ``` But also, it can be used for other expressions, e.g. arithmetical, like ```python a+b-100 ``` ## Install ```shell pip3 install evalidate ``` ## Security Built-in python features such as compile() or eval() are quite powerful to run any kind of user-supplied code, but could be insecure if used code is malicious like `os.system("rm -rf /")`. Evalidate works on whitelist principle, allowing code only if it consist only of safe operations (based on authors views about what is safe and what is not, your mileage may vary - but you can supply your list of safe operations) ## TL;DR. Just give me safe eval! ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException src="a+b" # source code # src="__import__('os').system('clear')" c={'a': 1, 'b': 2} # context, variables which will be available for code try: result = safeeval(src,c) print(result) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:", e) ``` Gives output: 3 In case of dangerous code: ```python src="__import__('os').system('clear')" ``` output will be: `ERR: Operation type Call is not allowed` ## Exceptions Evalidate throws exceptions `CompilationException`, `ValidationException`, `ExecutionException`. All of them inherit from base exception class `EvalException`. ## Configure validation Evalidate is very flexible, depending on parameters, same code can either pass validation or raise exception. ### safenodes and addnodes Evalidate has built-in set of python operations, which are considered 'safe' (from author point of view). Code is considered valid only if all of it's operations are in this list. You can override this list by adding argument `safenodes` like: ```python result = evalidate.safeeval(src, context, safenodes=['Expression','BinOp','Num','Add']) ``` this will be enough for `1+1` expression (in src argument), but not for `1-1`. If you will try '1-1', it will report error: `ERROR: Validation error: Operaton type Sub is not allowed` This way you can start from scratch and allow only required operations. As an alternative, you can use built-in list of allowed operations and extend it if needed, using `addnodes` argument. For example, "1*1" will give error: ERROR: Validation error: Operaton type Mult is not allowed But it will work with addnodes: ```python result = evalidate.safeeval(src,c, addnodes=['Mult']) ``` Please note, using 'Mult' operation isn't very secure, because for strings it can lead to Out-of-memory: ```python src='"a"*1000000*1000000*1000000*1000000' ``` and will raise runtime exception: `ERROR: Runtime error (OverflowError): repeated string is too long` ### Allowing function calls Evalidate does not allow any function calls by default: ``` >>> from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException >>> try: ... safeeval('int(1)') ... except EvalException as e: ... print(e) ... Operation type Call is not allowed ``` To enable int() function, need to allow 'Call' node and add this function to list of allowed function: ``` >>> evalidate.safeeval('int(1)', addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int']) 1 ``` Attempt to call other functions will fail (because it's not in funcs list): ``` evalidate.safeeval('1+round(2)', addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int']) ``` This will throw `ValidationException`. Attributes calls (`"aaa".startswith("a")`) could be allowed (with proper `addnodes` and `attrs`) but other indirect function calls (like: `__builtins__['eval']("print(1)")`) are not allowed, ### accessing attributes (attrs parameter), data as classes If data represented as object with attributes (not as dictionary) we have to add 'Attribute' to safe nodes. Increase salary for person for 200, and additionaly 25 for each year (s)he works in company. ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException class Person: pass p = Person() p.salary=1000 p.age=5 data = {'p':p} src = 'p.salary+200+p.age*25' try: result = safeeval(src,data,addnodes=['Attribute','Mult'], attrs=['salary', 'age']) print("result", result) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:",e) ``` ### calling attributes This code will not work: ~~~ safeeval('"abc".startswith("a")') ~~~ Because: `evalidate.ValidationException: Operation type Call is not allowed` To make it working: ~~~ print(safeeval('"abc".startswith("a")', addnodes=['Call', 'Attribute'], attrs=['startswith'])) ~~~ ## Functions `safeeval()` is simplest possible replacement to `eval()`. It is good to evaluate something once or few times, where speed is not an issue. If you need to eval same code 2nd time, it will take same 'long' time to parse/validate code. `evalidate()` is just little more complex, but returns validated safe python AST node, which can be compiled to python bytecode, and executed at full speed. (And this code is safe after evalidate) `security.test_security()` checks configuration(nodes, funcs, attrs) against set of attacks. ### evalidate.safeeval() ```python result = safeeval(expression, context={}, safenodes=None, addnodes=None, funcs=None, attrs=None) ``` `safeeval` is higher-level wrapper of evalidate(), which validates code and runs it (if validation is successful). Throws exception if compilation(parsing), validation or execution fails. `expression` - python expression like `salary+100` or `category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0`. `context` - dictionary of variables, available for evaluated code. `safenodes`, `addnodes`, `funcs` and `attrs` are same as in `evalidate()` returns result of evaluation of expression. ### evalidate.evalidate() ```python node = evalidate(expression, safenodes=None, addnodes=None, funcs=None, attrs=None) ``` `evalidate()` is main (and recommended to use) method, performs parsing of python expession, validates it, and returns python AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) structure, which can be later compiled and executed. Evalidate does not evaluates code, use `compile()` and `eval()` after `evalidate()`. ```python >>> import evalidate >>> node = evalidate.evalidate('1+2') >>> code = compile(node,'','eval') >>> eval(code) 3 ``` - `expression` - python expression `salary+100` or `category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0`. - `safenodes` - list of allowed nodes. This will *override* built-in list of allowed nodes. e.g. `safenodes=['Expression','BinOp','Num','Add'])` - `addnodes` - list of allowed nodes. This will *extend* built-in lsit of allowed nodes. e.g. `addnodes=['Mult']` - `funcs` - list of allowed function calls. You need to add 'Call' to safe nodes. e.g. `funcs=['int']` - `attrs` - list of allowed attributes. You need to add 'Attribute' to attrs. e.g. `attrs=['salary']`. evalidate() throws `CompilationException` if cannot parse source code and `ValidationException` if it doesn't like source code (if code has unsafe operations). Even if evalidate is successful, this doesn't guarantees that code will run well, For example, code still can have `NameError` (if tries to access undefined variable) or `ZeroDivisionError`. evalidate uses [ast.parse()](https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html#ast.parse) and returns [AST node](https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html#node-classes). >Warning > >It is possible to crash the Python interpreter with a sufficiently large/complex string due to stack depth limitations in Python’s AST compiler. In my test, works well with 200 nested int(): `int(int(.... int(1)...))` but not with 201. Source code is 1000+ characters. But even if evalidate will get such code, it will just raise `CompilationException`. ### evalidate.security.test_security Evalidate is very flexible and it's possible to shoot yourself in foot if you will try hard. `test_security()` checks your configuration (addnodes/safenodes, funcs, attrs) against given list of possible attack code or against built-in list of attacks. `test_security()` returns True if everything is OK (all attacks raised ValidationException) or False if something passed. This code will never print (I hope). ~~~ from evalidate.security import test_security test_security() or print("default rules are vulnerable!") ~~~ But this will fail because nodes/funcs leads to successful validation for attack (suppose you do not want anyone to call `int()`) ~~~ from evalidate.security import test_security attacks = ['int(1)'] test_security(attacks, addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int'], verbose=True) ~~~ It will print: ~~~ Testing attack code: int(1) Problem! Attack passed validation without exception! Code: int(1) ~~~ ## Examples ### Filtering by user-supplied condition ### ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException depot = [ { 'book': 'Sirens of Titan', 'price': 12, 'stock': 4 }, { 'book': 'Gone Girl', 'price': 9.8, 'stock': 0 }, { 'book': 'Choke', 'price': 14, 'stock': 2 }, { 'book': 'Pulp', 'price': 7.45, 'stock': 4 } ] #src='stock==0' # books out of stock src='stock>0 and price>8' # expensive book available for sale for book in depot: try: result = safeeval(src,book) if result: print(book) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:", e) ``` With first src line ('stock==0') it gives: {'price': 9.8, 'book': 'Gone Girl', 'stock': 0} With second src line ('stock>0 and price>8') it gives: {'price': 12, 'book': 'Sirens of Titan', 'stock': 4} {'price': 14, 'book': 'Choke', 'stock': 2} Note, it uses simple and slow function safeeval(). Each call of safeeval it will parse and validate same source code, and it's not effective. But it's OK if you have small set of elements to check. For better example check `examples/products.py` in repo. It uses dataset "products" from https://dummyjson.com/ and it's much more effective on large lists. ~~~shell # print all 100 products ./products.py # Only cheap products, 8 matches ./products.py 'price<20' # smartphones (5) ./products.py 'category=="smartphones"' # good smartphones ./products.py 'category=="smartphones" and rating>4.5' # cheap smartphones ./products.py 'category=="smartphones" and price<300' ~~~ ### Validate, compile and evaluate code ```python import evalidate def test(src): data={'one':1,'two':2} try: node = evalidate.evalidate(src) except evalidate.CompilationException: print("Bad source code:", repr(src)) return except evalidate.ValidationException: print("Dangerous code:", repr(src)) return code = compile(node,'','eval') try: result = eval(code,{},data) print("result:", result) except Exception as e: # almost any kind of exception can happen here print("Runtime exception:",e) srclist=['one+two+3', 'one+two+3+os.system("clear")', '', '1/0'] for src in srclist: test(src) ``` ## Similar projects and benchmark [asteval](https://newville.github.io/asteval/) While asteval can compute much more complex code (define functions, use python math libraries) it has drawbacks: - asteval is much slower (evalidate can be used at speed of eval() python bytecode) - user can provide source code which runs very long time and consumes many resources evalidate is good to run short same code against different data. ## Benchmarking We use `evalidate-vs-asteval.py` which is in benchmark/ directory of repository ~~~ $ ./evalidate-vs-asteval.py Src: a+b Context: {'a': 1, 'b': 2} Runs: 100000 asteval: 3.538s asteval (reuse interpreter): 1.232s safeeval: 2.384s evalidate/compile/eval (reuse compiled code): 0.017s ~~~ 0.017s vs 1.232s ## Read about eval() risks - https://nedbatchelder.com/blog/201206/eval_really_is_dangerous.html - https://netsec.expert/posts/breaking-python3-eval-protections/ - https://realpython.com/python-eval-function/ Note: realpython article shows example with nice short method of validation source (using `code.co_names`), but it's vulnerable, it passes "bomb" from Ned Batchelder article (bomb has empty `co_names` tuple) and crash interpreter. Evalidate can block this code and similar bombs (unless you will intentionally configure evalidate to pass specific bomb code. Yes, with evalidate it is hard to shoot yourself in the foot, but it is possible if you will try hard). ## More info Want more info? Check source code of module, it's very short and simple, easy to modify ## Contact Write me: yaroslaff at gmail.com %package -n python3-evalidate Summary: Validation and secure evaluation of untrusted python expressions Provides: python-evalidate BuildRequires: python3-devel BuildRequires: python3-setuptools BuildRequires: python3-pip %description -n python3-evalidate # Evalidate Evalidate is simple python module for safe eval()'uating user-supplied (possible malicious) logical expressions in python syntax. ## Purpose Originally it's developed for filtering (performing boolean expressions) complex data structures e.g. find employees: ```python person.age>30 and person.salary>5000 or "Jack" in person.children ``` Or find cheap smartphones: ```python category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0 ``` But also, it can be used for other expressions, e.g. arithmetical, like ```python a+b-100 ``` ## Install ```shell pip3 install evalidate ``` ## Security Built-in python features such as compile() or eval() are quite powerful to run any kind of user-supplied code, but could be insecure if used code is malicious like `os.system("rm -rf /")`. Evalidate works on whitelist principle, allowing code only if it consist only of safe operations (based on authors views about what is safe and what is not, your mileage may vary - but you can supply your list of safe operations) ## TL;DR. Just give me safe eval! ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException src="a+b" # source code # src="__import__('os').system('clear')" c={'a': 1, 'b': 2} # context, variables which will be available for code try: result = safeeval(src,c) print(result) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:", e) ``` Gives output: 3 In case of dangerous code: ```python src="__import__('os').system('clear')" ``` output will be: `ERR: Operation type Call is not allowed` ## Exceptions Evalidate throws exceptions `CompilationException`, `ValidationException`, `ExecutionException`. All of them inherit from base exception class `EvalException`. ## Configure validation Evalidate is very flexible, depending on parameters, same code can either pass validation or raise exception. ### safenodes and addnodes Evalidate has built-in set of python operations, which are considered 'safe' (from author point of view). Code is considered valid only if all of it's operations are in this list. You can override this list by adding argument `safenodes` like: ```python result = evalidate.safeeval(src, context, safenodes=['Expression','BinOp','Num','Add']) ``` this will be enough for `1+1` expression (in src argument), but not for `1-1`. If you will try '1-1', it will report error: `ERROR: Validation error: Operaton type Sub is not allowed` This way you can start from scratch and allow only required operations. As an alternative, you can use built-in list of allowed operations and extend it if needed, using `addnodes` argument. For example, "1*1" will give error: ERROR: Validation error: Operaton type Mult is not allowed But it will work with addnodes: ```python result = evalidate.safeeval(src,c, addnodes=['Mult']) ``` Please note, using 'Mult' operation isn't very secure, because for strings it can lead to Out-of-memory: ```python src='"a"*1000000*1000000*1000000*1000000' ``` and will raise runtime exception: `ERROR: Runtime error (OverflowError): repeated string is too long` ### Allowing function calls Evalidate does not allow any function calls by default: ``` >>> from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException >>> try: ... safeeval('int(1)') ... except EvalException as e: ... print(e) ... Operation type Call is not allowed ``` To enable int() function, need to allow 'Call' node and add this function to list of allowed function: ``` >>> evalidate.safeeval('int(1)', addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int']) 1 ``` Attempt to call other functions will fail (because it's not in funcs list): ``` evalidate.safeeval('1+round(2)', addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int']) ``` This will throw `ValidationException`. Attributes calls (`"aaa".startswith("a")`) could be allowed (with proper `addnodes` and `attrs`) but other indirect function calls (like: `__builtins__['eval']("print(1)")`) are not allowed, ### accessing attributes (attrs parameter), data as classes If data represented as object with attributes (not as dictionary) we have to add 'Attribute' to safe nodes. Increase salary for person for 200, and additionaly 25 for each year (s)he works in company. ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException class Person: pass p = Person() p.salary=1000 p.age=5 data = {'p':p} src = 'p.salary+200+p.age*25' try: result = safeeval(src,data,addnodes=['Attribute','Mult'], attrs=['salary', 'age']) print("result", result) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:",e) ``` ### calling attributes This code will not work: ~~~ safeeval('"abc".startswith("a")') ~~~ Because: `evalidate.ValidationException: Operation type Call is not allowed` To make it working: ~~~ print(safeeval('"abc".startswith("a")', addnodes=['Call', 'Attribute'], attrs=['startswith'])) ~~~ ## Functions `safeeval()` is simplest possible replacement to `eval()`. It is good to evaluate something once or few times, where speed is not an issue. If you need to eval same code 2nd time, it will take same 'long' time to parse/validate code. `evalidate()` is just little more complex, but returns validated safe python AST node, which can be compiled to python bytecode, and executed at full speed. (And this code is safe after evalidate) `security.test_security()` checks configuration(nodes, funcs, attrs) against set of attacks. ### evalidate.safeeval() ```python result = safeeval(expression, context={}, safenodes=None, addnodes=None, funcs=None, attrs=None) ``` `safeeval` is higher-level wrapper of evalidate(), which validates code and runs it (if validation is successful). Throws exception if compilation(parsing), validation or execution fails. `expression` - python expression like `salary+100` or `category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0`. `context` - dictionary of variables, available for evaluated code. `safenodes`, `addnodes`, `funcs` and `attrs` are same as in `evalidate()` returns result of evaluation of expression. ### evalidate.evalidate() ```python node = evalidate(expression, safenodes=None, addnodes=None, funcs=None, attrs=None) ``` `evalidate()` is main (and recommended to use) method, performs parsing of python expession, validates it, and returns python AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) structure, which can be later compiled and executed. Evalidate does not evaluates code, use `compile()` and `eval()` after `evalidate()`. ```python >>> import evalidate >>> node = evalidate.evalidate('1+2') >>> code = compile(node,'','eval') >>> eval(code) 3 ``` - `expression` - python expression `salary+100` or `category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0`. - `safenodes` - list of allowed nodes. This will *override* built-in list of allowed nodes. e.g. `safenodes=['Expression','BinOp','Num','Add'])` - `addnodes` - list of allowed nodes. This will *extend* built-in lsit of allowed nodes. e.g. `addnodes=['Mult']` - `funcs` - list of allowed function calls. You need to add 'Call' to safe nodes. e.g. `funcs=['int']` - `attrs` - list of allowed attributes. You need to add 'Attribute' to attrs. e.g. `attrs=['salary']`. evalidate() throws `CompilationException` if cannot parse source code and `ValidationException` if it doesn't like source code (if code has unsafe operations). Even if evalidate is successful, this doesn't guarantees that code will run well, For example, code still can have `NameError` (if tries to access undefined variable) or `ZeroDivisionError`. evalidate uses [ast.parse()](https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html#ast.parse) and returns [AST node](https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html#node-classes). >Warning > >It is possible to crash the Python interpreter with a sufficiently large/complex string due to stack depth limitations in Python’s AST compiler. In my test, works well with 200 nested int(): `int(int(.... int(1)...))` but not with 201. Source code is 1000+ characters. But even if evalidate will get such code, it will just raise `CompilationException`. ### evalidate.security.test_security Evalidate is very flexible and it's possible to shoot yourself in foot if you will try hard. `test_security()` checks your configuration (addnodes/safenodes, funcs, attrs) against given list of possible attack code or against built-in list of attacks. `test_security()` returns True if everything is OK (all attacks raised ValidationException) or False if something passed. This code will never print (I hope). ~~~ from evalidate.security import test_security test_security() or print("default rules are vulnerable!") ~~~ But this will fail because nodes/funcs leads to successful validation for attack (suppose you do not want anyone to call `int()`) ~~~ from evalidate.security import test_security attacks = ['int(1)'] test_security(attacks, addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int'], verbose=True) ~~~ It will print: ~~~ Testing attack code: int(1) Problem! Attack passed validation without exception! Code: int(1) ~~~ ## Examples ### Filtering by user-supplied condition ### ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException depot = [ { 'book': 'Sirens of Titan', 'price': 12, 'stock': 4 }, { 'book': 'Gone Girl', 'price': 9.8, 'stock': 0 }, { 'book': 'Choke', 'price': 14, 'stock': 2 }, { 'book': 'Pulp', 'price': 7.45, 'stock': 4 } ] #src='stock==0' # books out of stock src='stock>0 and price>8' # expensive book available for sale for book in depot: try: result = safeeval(src,book) if result: print(book) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:", e) ``` With first src line ('stock==0') it gives: {'price': 9.8, 'book': 'Gone Girl', 'stock': 0} With second src line ('stock>0 and price>8') it gives: {'price': 12, 'book': 'Sirens of Titan', 'stock': 4} {'price': 14, 'book': 'Choke', 'stock': 2} Note, it uses simple and slow function safeeval(). Each call of safeeval it will parse and validate same source code, and it's not effective. But it's OK if you have small set of elements to check. For better example check `examples/products.py` in repo. It uses dataset "products" from https://dummyjson.com/ and it's much more effective on large lists. ~~~shell # print all 100 products ./products.py # Only cheap products, 8 matches ./products.py 'price<20' # smartphones (5) ./products.py 'category=="smartphones"' # good smartphones ./products.py 'category=="smartphones" and rating>4.5' # cheap smartphones ./products.py 'category=="smartphones" and price<300' ~~~ ### Validate, compile and evaluate code ```python import evalidate def test(src): data={'one':1,'two':2} try: node = evalidate.evalidate(src) except evalidate.CompilationException: print("Bad source code:", repr(src)) return except evalidate.ValidationException: print("Dangerous code:", repr(src)) return code = compile(node,'','eval') try: result = eval(code,{},data) print("result:", result) except Exception as e: # almost any kind of exception can happen here print("Runtime exception:",e) srclist=['one+two+3', 'one+two+3+os.system("clear")', '', '1/0'] for src in srclist: test(src) ``` ## Similar projects and benchmark [asteval](https://newville.github.io/asteval/) While asteval can compute much more complex code (define functions, use python math libraries) it has drawbacks: - asteval is much slower (evalidate can be used at speed of eval() python bytecode) - user can provide source code which runs very long time and consumes many resources evalidate is good to run short same code against different data. ## Benchmarking We use `evalidate-vs-asteval.py` which is in benchmark/ directory of repository ~~~ $ ./evalidate-vs-asteval.py Src: a+b Context: {'a': 1, 'b': 2} Runs: 100000 asteval: 3.538s asteval (reuse interpreter): 1.232s safeeval: 2.384s evalidate/compile/eval (reuse compiled code): 0.017s ~~~ 0.017s vs 1.232s ## Read about eval() risks - https://nedbatchelder.com/blog/201206/eval_really_is_dangerous.html - https://netsec.expert/posts/breaking-python3-eval-protections/ - https://realpython.com/python-eval-function/ Note: realpython article shows example with nice short method of validation source (using `code.co_names`), but it's vulnerable, it passes "bomb" from Ned Batchelder article (bomb has empty `co_names` tuple) and crash interpreter. Evalidate can block this code and similar bombs (unless you will intentionally configure evalidate to pass specific bomb code. Yes, with evalidate it is hard to shoot yourself in the foot, but it is possible if you will try hard). ## More info Want more info? Check source code of module, it's very short and simple, easy to modify ## Contact Write me: yaroslaff at gmail.com %package help Summary: Development documents and examples for evalidate Provides: python3-evalidate-doc %description help # Evalidate Evalidate is simple python module for safe eval()'uating user-supplied (possible malicious) logical expressions in python syntax. ## Purpose Originally it's developed for filtering (performing boolean expressions) complex data structures e.g. find employees: ```python person.age>30 and person.salary>5000 or "Jack" in person.children ``` Or find cheap smartphones: ```python category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0 ``` But also, it can be used for other expressions, e.g. arithmetical, like ```python a+b-100 ``` ## Install ```shell pip3 install evalidate ``` ## Security Built-in python features such as compile() or eval() are quite powerful to run any kind of user-supplied code, but could be insecure if used code is malicious like `os.system("rm -rf /")`. Evalidate works on whitelist principle, allowing code only if it consist only of safe operations (based on authors views about what is safe and what is not, your mileage may vary - but you can supply your list of safe operations) ## TL;DR. Just give me safe eval! ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException src="a+b" # source code # src="__import__('os').system('clear')" c={'a': 1, 'b': 2} # context, variables which will be available for code try: result = safeeval(src,c) print(result) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:", e) ``` Gives output: 3 In case of dangerous code: ```python src="__import__('os').system('clear')" ``` output will be: `ERR: Operation type Call is not allowed` ## Exceptions Evalidate throws exceptions `CompilationException`, `ValidationException`, `ExecutionException`. All of them inherit from base exception class `EvalException`. ## Configure validation Evalidate is very flexible, depending on parameters, same code can either pass validation or raise exception. ### safenodes and addnodes Evalidate has built-in set of python operations, which are considered 'safe' (from author point of view). Code is considered valid only if all of it's operations are in this list. You can override this list by adding argument `safenodes` like: ```python result = evalidate.safeeval(src, context, safenodes=['Expression','BinOp','Num','Add']) ``` this will be enough for `1+1` expression (in src argument), but not for `1-1`. If you will try '1-1', it will report error: `ERROR: Validation error: Operaton type Sub is not allowed` This way you can start from scratch and allow only required operations. As an alternative, you can use built-in list of allowed operations and extend it if needed, using `addnodes` argument. For example, "1*1" will give error: ERROR: Validation error: Operaton type Mult is not allowed But it will work with addnodes: ```python result = evalidate.safeeval(src,c, addnodes=['Mult']) ``` Please note, using 'Mult' operation isn't very secure, because for strings it can lead to Out-of-memory: ```python src='"a"*1000000*1000000*1000000*1000000' ``` and will raise runtime exception: `ERROR: Runtime error (OverflowError): repeated string is too long` ### Allowing function calls Evalidate does not allow any function calls by default: ``` >>> from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException >>> try: ... safeeval('int(1)') ... except EvalException as e: ... print(e) ... Operation type Call is not allowed ``` To enable int() function, need to allow 'Call' node and add this function to list of allowed function: ``` >>> evalidate.safeeval('int(1)', addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int']) 1 ``` Attempt to call other functions will fail (because it's not in funcs list): ``` evalidate.safeeval('1+round(2)', addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int']) ``` This will throw `ValidationException`. Attributes calls (`"aaa".startswith("a")`) could be allowed (with proper `addnodes` and `attrs`) but other indirect function calls (like: `__builtins__['eval']("print(1)")`) are not allowed, ### accessing attributes (attrs parameter), data as classes If data represented as object with attributes (not as dictionary) we have to add 'Attribute' to safe nodes. Increase salary for person for 200, and additionaly 25 for each year (s)he works in company. ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException class Person: pass p = Person() p.salary=1000 p.age=5 data = {'p':p} src = 'p.salary+200+p.age*25' try: result = safeeval(src,data,addnodes=['Attribute','Mult'], attrs=['salary', 'age']) print("result", result) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:",e) ``` ### calling attributes This code will not work: ~~~ safeeval('"abc".startswith("a")') ~~~ Because: `evalidate.ValidationException: Operation type Call is not allowed` To make it working: ~~~ print(safeeval('"abc".startswith("a")', addnodes=['Call', 'Attribute'], attrs=['startswith'])) ~~~ ## Functions `safeeval()` is simplest possible replacement to `eval()`. It is good to evaluate something once or few times, where speed is not an issue. If you need to eval same code 2nd time, it will take same 'long' time to parse/validate code. `evalidate()` is just little more complex, but returns validated safe python AST node, which can be compiled to python bytecode, and executed at full speed. (And this code is safe after evalidate) `security.test_security()` checks configuration(nodes, funcs, attrs) against set of attacks. ### evalidate.safeeval() ```python result = safeeval(expression, context={}, safenodes=None, addnodes=None, funcs=None, attrs=None) ``` `safeeval` is higher-level wrapper of evalidate(), which validates code and runs it (if validation is successful). Throws exception if compilation(parsing), validation or execution fails. `expression` - python expression like `salary+100` or `category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0`. `context` - dictionary of variables, available for evaluated code. `safenodes`, `addnodes`, `funcs` and `attrs` are same as in `evalidate()` returns result of evaluation of expression. ### evalidate.evalidate() ```python node = evalidate(expression, safenodes=None, addnodes=None, funcs=None, attrs=None) ``` `evalidate()` is main (and recommended to use) method, performs parsing of python expession, validates it, and returns python AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) structure, which can be later compiled and executed. Evalidate does not evaluates code, use `compile()` and `eval()` after `evalidate()`. ```python >>> import evalidate >>> node = evalidate.evalidate('1+2') >>> code = compile(node,'','eval') >>> eval(code) 3 ``` - `expression` - python expression `salary+100` or `category="smartphones" and price<300 and stock>0`. - `safenodes` - list of allowed nodes. This will *override* built-in list of allowed nodes. e.g. `safenodes=['Expression','BinOp','Num','Add'])` - `addnodes` - list of allowed nodes. This will *extend* built-in lsit of allowed nodes. e.g. `addnodes=['Mult']` - `funcs` - list of allowed function calls. You need to add 'Call' to safe nodes. e.g. `funcs=['int']` - `attrs` - list of allowed attributes. You need to add 'Attribute' to attrs. e.g. `attrs=['salary']`. evalidate() throws `CompilationException` if cannot parse source code and `ValidationException` if it doesn't like source code (if code has unsafe operations). Even if evalidate is successful, this doesn't guarantees that code will run well, For example, code still can have `NameError` (if tries to access undefined variable) or `ZeroDivisionError`. evalidate uses [ast.parse()](https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html#ast.parse) and returns [AST node](https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html#node-classes). >Warning > >It is possible to crash the Python interpreter with a sufficiently large/complex string due to stack depth limitations in Python’s AST compiler. In my test, works well with 200 nested int(): `int(int(.... int(1)...))` but not with 201. Source code is 1000+ characters. But even if evalidate will get such code, it will just raise `CompilationException`. ### evalidate.security.test_security Evalidate is very flexible and it's possible to shoot yourself in foot if you will try hard. `test_security()` checks your configuration (addnodes/safenodes, funcs, attrs) against given list of possible attack code or against built-in list of attacks. `test_security()` returns True if everything is OK (all attacks raised ValidationException) or False if something passed. This code will never print (I hope). ~~~ from evalidate.security import test_security test_security() or print("default rules are vulnerable!") ~~~ But this will fail because nodes/funcs leads to successful validation for attack (suppose you do not want anyone to call `int()`) ~~~ from evalidate.security import test_security attacks = ['int(1)'] test_security(attacks, addnodes=['Call'], funcs=['int'], verbose=True) ~~~ It will print: ~~~ Testing attack code: int(1) Problem! Attack passed validation without exception! Code: int(1) ~~~ ## Examples ### Filtering by user-supplied condition ### ```python from evalidate import safeeval, EvalException depot = [ { 'book': 'Sirens of Titan', 'price': 12, 'stock': 4 }, { 'book': 'Gone Girl', 'price': 9.8, 'stock': 0 }, { 'book': 'Choke', 'price': 14, 'stock': 2 }, { 'book': 'Pulp', 'price': 7.45, 'stock': 4 } ] #src='stock==0' # books out of stock src='stock>0 and price>8' # expensive book available for sale for book in depot: try: result = safeeval(src,book) if result: print(book) except EvalException as e: print("ERR:", e) ``` With first src line ('stock==0') it gives: {'price': 9.8, 'book': 'Gone Girl', 'stock': 0} With second src line ('stock>0 and price>8') it gives: {'price': 12, 'book': 'Sirens of Titan', 'stock': 4} {'price': 14, 'book': 'Choke', 'stock': 2} Note, it uses simple and slow function safeeval(). Each call of safeeval it will parse and validate same source code, and it's not effective. But it's OK if you have small set of elements to check. For better example check `examples/products.py` in repo. It uses dataset "products" from https://dummyjson.com/ and it's much more effective on large lists. ~~~shell # print all 100 products ./products.py # Only cheap products, 8 matches ./products.py 'price<20' # smartphones (5) ./products.py 'category=="smartphones"' # good smartphones ./products.py 'category=="smartphones" and rating>4.5' # cheap smartphones ./products.py 'category=="smartphones" and price<300' ~~~ ### Validate, compile and evaluate code ```python import evalidate def test(src): data={'one':1,'two':2} try: node = evalidate.evalidate(src) except evalidate.CompilationException: print("Bad source code:", repr(src)) return except evalidate.ValidationException: print("Dangerous code:", repr(src)) return code = compile(node,'','eval') try: result = eval(code,{},data) print("result:", result) except Exception as e: # almost any kind of exception can happen here print("Runtime exception:",e) srclist=['one+two+3', 'one+two+3+os.system("clear")', '', '1/0'] for src in srclist: test(src) ``` ## Similar projects and benchmark [asteval](https://newville.github.io/asteval/) While asteval can compute much more complex code (define functions, use python math libraries) it has drawbacks: - asteval is much slower (evalidate can be used at speed of eval() python bytecode) - user can provide source code which runs very long time and consumes many resources evalidate is good to run short same code against different data. ## Benchmarking We use `evalidate-vs-asteval.py` which is in benchmark/ directory of repository ~~~ $ ./evalidate-vs-asteval.py Src: a+b Context: {'a': 1, 'b': 2} Runs: 100000 asteval: 3.538s asteval (reuse interpreter): 1.232s safeeval: 2.384s evalidate/compile/eval (reuse compiled code): 0.017s ~~~ 0.017s vs 1.232s ## Read about eval() risks - https://nedbatchelder.com/blog/201206/eval_really_is_dangerous.html - https://netsec.expert/posts/breaking-python3-eval-protections/ - https://realpython.com/python-eval-function/ Note: realpython article shows example with nice short method of validation source (using `code.co_names`), but it's vulnerable, it passes "bomb" from Ned Batchelder article (bomb has empty `co_names` tuple) and crash interpreter. Evalidate can block this code and similar bombs (unless you will intentionally configure evalidate to pass specific bomb code. Yes, with evalidate it is hard to shoot yourself in the foot, but it is possible if you will try hard). ## More info Want more info? Check source code of module, it's very short and simple, easy to modify ## Contact Write me: yaroslaff at gmail.com %prep %autosetup -n evalidate-1.0.2 %build %py3_build %install %py3_install install -d -m755 %{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir} if [ -d doc ]; then cp -arf doc %{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir}; fi if [ -d docs ]; then cp -arf docs %{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir}; fi if [ -d example ]; then cp -arf example %{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir}; fi if [ -d examples ]; then cp -arf examples %{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir}; fi pushd %{buildroot} if [ -d usr/lib ]; then find usr/lib -type f -printf "/%h/%f\n" >> filelist.lst fi if [ -d usr/lib64 ]; then find usr/lib64 -type f -printf "/%h/%f\n" >> filelist.lst fi if [ -d usr/bin ]; then find usr/bin -type f -printf "/%h/%f\n" >> filelist.lst fi if [ -d usr/sbin ]; then find usr/sbin -type f -printf "/%h/%f\n" >> filelist.lst fi touch doclist.lst if [ -d usr/share/man ]; then find usr/share/man -type f -printf "/%h/%f.gz\n" >> doclist.lst fi popd mv %{buildroot}/filelist.lst . mv %{buildroot}/doclist.lst . %files -n python3-evalidate -f filelist.lst %dir %{python3_sitelib}/* %files help -f doclist.lst %{_docdir}/* %changelog * Tue May 30 2023 Python_Bot - 1.0.2-1 - Package Spec generated