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-rw-r--r--runtime-re-enable-implicit-rejection.patch169
1 files changed, 169 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/runtime-re-enable-implicit-rejection.patch b/runtime-re-enable-implicit-rejection.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4f0e0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/runtime-re-enable-implicit-rejection.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+From f55ebb4597a1a931edee16283fc43a4ff33d1029 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Omair Majid <omajid@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 12:23:28 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Disable implicit rejection for RSA PKCS#1 (#95217)"
+
+This reverts commit a314c5b3580a9fe25c59d917ff0b7594efc6f81f.
+
+To quote Clemens Lang:
+
+> [Disabling implcit rejection] re-enables a Bleichenbacher timing oracle
+> attack against PKCS#1v1.5 decryption. See
+> https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/ for details and
+> https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/pull/95157#issuecomment-1842784399 for a
+> comment by the researcher who published the vulnerability and proposed the
+> change in OpenSSL.
+
+For more details, see:
+https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/pull/95217#issuecomment-1842799362
+---
+ .../RSA/EncryptDecrypt.cs | 49 ++++---------------
+ .../opensslshim.h | 6 ---
+ .../pal_evp_pkey_rsa.c | 13 -----
+ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/runtime/src/libraries/Common/tests/System/Security/Cryptography/AlgorithmImplementations/RSA/EncryptDecrypt.cs b/src/runtime/src/libraries/Common/tests/System/Security/Cryptography/AlgorithmImplementations/RSA/EncryptDecrypt.cs
+index 55a044d62a6..e72d42e87d2 100644
+--- a/src/runtime/src/libraries/Common/tests/System/Security/Cryptography/AlgorithmImplementations/RSA/EncryptDecrypt.cs
++++ b/src/runtime/src/libraries/Common/tests/System/Security/Cryptography/AlgorithmImplementations/RSA/EncryptDecrypt.cs
+@@ -338,10 +338,19 @@ private void RsaCryptRoundtrip(RSAEncryptionPadding paddingMode, bool expectSucc
+ Assert.Equal(TestData.HelloBytes, output);
+ }
+
+- [ConditionalFact(nameof(PlatformSupportsEmptyRSAEncryption))]
++ [ConditionalFact]
+ [SkipOnTargetFramework(TargetFrameworkMonikers.NetFramework)]
+ public void RoundtripEmptyArray()
+ {
++ if (OperatingSystem.IsIOS() && !OperatingSystem.IsIOSVersionAtLeast(13, 6))
++ {
++ throw new SkipTestException("iOS prior to 13.6 does not reliably support RSA encryption of empty data.");
++ }
++ if (OperatingSystem.IsTvOS() && !OperatingSystem.IsTvOSVersionAtLeast(14, 0))
++ {
++ throw new SkipTestException("tvOS prior to 14.0 does not reliably support RSA encryption of empty data.");
++ }
++
+ using (RSA rsa = RSAFactory.Create(TestData.RSA2048Params))
+ {
+ void RoundtripEmpty(RSAEncryptionPadding paddingMode)
+@@ -692,26 +701,6 @@ public void NotSupportedValueMethods()
+ }
+ }
+
+- [ConditionalTheory]
+- [InlineData(new byte[] { 1, 2, 3, 4 })]
+- [InlineData(new byte[0])]
+- public void Decrypt_Pkcs1_ErrorsForInvalidPadding(byte[] data)
+- {
+- if (data.Length == 0 && !PlatformSupportsEmptyRSAEncryption)
+- {
+- throw new SkipTestException("Platform does not support RSA encryption of empty data.");
+- }
+-
+- using (RSA rsa = RSAFactory.Create(TestData.RSA2048Params))
+- {
+- byte[] encrypted = Encrypt(rsa, data, RSAEncryptionPadding.Pkcs1);
+- encrypted[1] ^= 0xFF;
+-
+- // PKCS#1, the data, and the key are all deterministic so this should always throw an exception.
+- Assert.ThrowsAny<CryptographicException>(() => Decrypt(rsa, encrypted, RSAEncryptionPadding.Pkcs1));
+- }
+- }
+-
+ [Fact]
+ public void Decrypt_Pkcs1_BadPadding()
+ {
+@@ -726,23 +715,5 @@ public static IEnumerable<object[]> OaepPaddingModes
+ }
+ }
+ }
+-
+- public static bool PlatformSupportsEmptyRSAEncryption
+- {
+- get
+- {
+- if (OperatingSystem.IsIOS() && !OperatingSystem.IsIOSVersionAtLeast(13, 6))
+- {
+- return false;
+- }
+-
+- if (OperatingSystem.IsTvOS() && !OperatingSystem.IsTvOSVersionAtLeast(14, 0))
+- {
+- return false;
+- }
+-
+- return true;
+- }
+- }
+ }
+ }
+diff --git a/src/runtime/src/native/libs/System.Security.Cryptography.Native/opensslshim.h b/src/runtime/src/native/libs/System.Security.Cryptography.Native/opensslshim.h
+index 7d5ec84cc7d..efc0d470602 100644
+--- a/src/runtime/src/native/libs/System.Security.Cryptography.Native/opensslshim.h
++++ b/src/runtime/src/native/libs/System.Security.Cryptography.Native/opensslshim.h
+@@ -276,10 +276,8 @@ const EVP_CIPHER* EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void);
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(ERR_peek_error) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(ERR_peek_error_line) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(ERR_peek_last_error) \
+- REQUIRED_FUNCTION(ERR_pop_to_mark) \
+ FALLBACK_FUNCTION(ERR_put_error) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(ERR_reason_error_string) \
+- REQUIRED_FUNCTION(ERR_set_mark) \
+ LIGHTUP_FUNCTION(ERR_set_debug) \
+ LIGHTUP_FUNCTION(ERR_set_error) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(EVP_aes_128_cbc) \
+@@ -334,7 +332,6 @@ const EVP_CIPHER* EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void);
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(EVP_PKCS82PKEY) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(EVP_PKEY2PKCS8) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl) \
+- REQUIRED_FUNCTION(EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(EVP_PKEY_CTX_free) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey) \
+ REQUIRED_FUNCTION(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new) \
+@@ -761,10 +758,8 @@ FOR_ALL_OPENSSL_FUNCTIONS
+ #define ERR_peek_error_line ERR_peek_error_line_ptr
+ #define ERR_peek_last_error ERR_peek_last_error_ptr
+ #define ERR_put_error ERR_put_error_ptr
+-#define ERR_pop_to_mark ERR_pop_to_mark_ptr
+ #define ERR_reason_error_string ERR_reason_error_string_ptr
+ #define ERR_set_debug ERR_set_debug_ptr
+-#define ERR_set_mark ERR_set_mark_ptr
+ #define ERR_set_error ERR_set_error_ptr
+ #define EVP_aes_128_cbc EVP_aes_128_cbc_ptr
+ #define EVP_aes_128_cfb8 EVP_aes_128_cfb8_ptr
+@@ -818,7 +813,6 @@ FOR_ALL_OPENSSL_FUNCTIONS
+ #define EVP_PKCS82PKEY EVP_PKCS82PKEY_ptr
+ #define EVP_PKEY2PKCS8 EVP_PKEY2PKCS8_ptr
+ #define EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_ptr
+-#define EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str_ptr
+ #define EVP_PKEY_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_CTX_free_ptr
+ #define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey_ptr
+ #define EVP_PKEY_CTX_new EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_ptr
+diff --git a/src/runtime/src/native/libs/System.Security.Cryptography.Native/pal_evp_pkey_rsa.c b/src/runtime/src/native/libs/System.Security.Cryptography.Native/pal_evp_pkey_rsa.c
+index 043bf9f9d1e..c9ccdf33e3a 100644
+--- a/src/runtime/src/native/libs/System.Security.Cryptography.Native/pal_evp_pkey_rsa.c
++++ b/src/runtime/src/native/libs/System.Security.Cryptography.Native/pal_evp_pkey_rsa.c
+@@ -67,19 +67,6 @@ static bool ConfigureEncryption(EVP_PKEY_CTX* ctx, RsaPaddingMode padding, const
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+-
+- // OpenSSL 3.2 introduced a change where PKCS#1 RSA decryption does not fail for invalid padding.
+- // If the padding is invalid, the decryption operation returns random data.
+- // See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817 for background.
+- // Some Linux distributions backported this change to previous versions of OpenSSL.
+- // Here we do a best-effort to set a flag to revert the behavior to failing if the padding is invalid.
+- ERR_set_mark();
+-
+- EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0");
+-
+- // Undo any changes to the error queue that may have occured while configuring implicit rejection if the
+- // current version does not support implicit rejection.
+- ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+--
+2.43.0
+