summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch')
-rw-r--r--openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch160
1 files changed, 160 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch b/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6751a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.1.1-seclevel.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.seclevel 2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2020-06-05 17:16:54.835536823 +0200
+@@ -3225,6 +3225,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *c
+ }
+
+ static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
++static const int minbits_digest_table[] = { 80, 80, 128, 192, 256 };
+ static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
+
+ /*
+@@ -3276,6 +3277,11 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CT
+
+ if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
+ return 0;
+-
+- return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
++ /*
++ * Allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non-FIPS mode or when the magic
++ * disable SHA1 flag is not set.
++ */
++ if ((ctx->param->flags & 0x40000000) || FIPS_mode())
++ return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
++ return secbits >= minbits_digest_table[level - 1];
+ }
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod.seclevel 2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_security_level.pod 2020-06-04 15:48:01.608178833 +0200
+@@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ using MD5 for the MAC is also prohibited
+
+ =item B<Level 2>
+
+-Security level set to 112 bits of security. As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys
+-shorter than 2048 bits and ECC keys shorter than 224 bits are prohibited.
++Security level set to 112 bits of security with the exception of SHA1 allowed
++for signatures.
++As a result RSA, DSA and DH keys shorter than 2048 bits and ECC keys
++shorter than 224 bits are prohibited.
+ In addition to the level 1 exclusions any cipher suite using RC4 is also
+ prohibited. SSL version 3 is also not allowed. Compression is disabled.
+
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c.seclevel 2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_cert.c 2020-06-05 17:10:11.842198401 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
+ void *ex);
++static unsigned long sha1_disable(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+ static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+ static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+@@ -396,7 +397,7 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
+
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
++ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s) | sha1_disable(s, NULL));
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data
+ (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) {
+ goto end;
+@@ -953,12 +954,33 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
++ /* allow SHA1 in SECLEVEL 2 in non FIPS mode */
++ if (nid == NID_sha1 && minbits == 112 && !sha1_disable(s, ctx))
++ break;
+ if (bits < minbits)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++static unsigned long sha1_disable(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx)
++{
++ unsigned long ret = 0x40000000; /* a magical internal value used by X509_VERIFY_PARAM */
++ const CERT *c;
++
++ if (FIPS_mode())
++ return ret;
++
++ if (ctx != NULL) {
++ c = ctx->cert;
++ } else {
++ c = s->cert;
++ }
++ if (tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(c))
++ return 0;
++ return ret;
++}
++
+ int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+ {
+ return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h.seclevel 2020-06-04 15:48:01.602178783 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/ssl_local.h 2020-06-05 17:02:22.666313410 +0200
+@@ -2576,6 +2576,7 @@ __owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PAC
+ __owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s);
+ __owur int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ __owur int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd);
++int tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(const CERT *c);
+ __owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs);
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ __owur int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve);
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c.seclevel 2020-06-04 15:48:01.654179221 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/t1_lib.c 2020-06-05 17:02:40.268459157 +0200
+@@ -2145,6 +2145,36 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++static int tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(const uint16_t *sigalgs, size_t sigalgslen)
++{
++ size_t i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
++ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
++
++ if (lu == NULL)
++ continue;
++ if (lu->hash == NID_sha1)
++ return 1;
++ }
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
++int tls1_cert_sigalgs_have_sha1(const CERT *c)
++{
++ if (c->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
++ if (tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(c->client_sigalgs, c->client_sigalgslen))
++ return 1;
++ }
++ if (c->conf_sigalgs != NULL) {
++ if (tls1_sigalgs_have_sha1(c->conf_sigalgs, c->conf_sigalgslen))
++ return 1;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+ {
+ int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t.seclevel 2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t 2020-06-04 15:48:01.608178833 +0200
+@@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver
+ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
+ "CA with PSS signature using SHA256");
+
+-ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
+- "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 2");
++ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "3"),
++ "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 3");
+
+ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
+ "PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-04-29 09:54:43 +0000