diff options
author | CoprDistGit <infra@openeuler.org> | 2023-06-09 08:41:05 +0000 |
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committer | CoprDistGit <infra@openeuler.org> | 2023-06-09 08:41:05 +0000 |
commit | 4d2e143b15fdc8f316a1eef5a8b1053981f6d256 (patch) | |
tree | 10203472e783180b6364499f88ef2906b18b0049 /CVE-2021-21309.patch | |
parent | d7609b0abb011ea9d856ca663892f0f88d211f78 (diff) |
automatic import of redisopeneuler20.03
Diffstat (limited to 'CVE-2021-21309.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | CVE-2021-21309.patch | 150 |
1 files changed, 150 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/CVE-2021-21309.patch b/CVE-2021-21309.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e91579 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2021-21309.patch @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +From 48f04a82a0ac542341fb644a4cfbebadd5c59a33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yossi Gottlieb <yossigo@gmail.com> +Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 15:41:32 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow (CVE-2021-21309). (#8522) + +On 32-bit systems, setting the proto-max-bulk-len config parameter to a high value may result with integer overflow and a subsequent heap overflow when parsing an input bulk (CVE-2021-21309). + +This fix has two parts: + +Set a reasonable limit to the config parameter. +Add additional checks to prevent the problem in other potential but unknown code paths. + +(cherry picked from commit d32f2e9999ce003bad0bd2c3bca29f64dcce4433) + +Fix MSVR reported issue. +--- + src/config.c | 16 ++++++++-------- + src/sds.c | 3 +++ + src/zmalloc.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/config.c b/src/config.c +index 5f22442ecc5..0814768b9d9 100644 +--- a/src/config.c ++++ b/src/config.c +@@ -817,10 +817,10 @@ void loadServerConfig(char *filename, ch + if (max != LLONG_MAX && ll > max) goto badfmt; \ + _var = ll; + +-#define config_set_memory_field(_name,_var) \ ++#define config_set_memory_field(_name,_var,min,max) \ + } else if (!strcasecmp(c->argv[2]->ptr,_name)) { \ + ll = memtoll(o->ptr,&err); \ +- if (err || ll < 0) goto badfmt; \ ++ if (err || ll < (long long) (min) || ll > (long long) (max)) goto badfmt; \ + _var = ll; + + #define config_set_enum_field(_name,_var,_enumvar) \ +@@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ void configSetCommand(client *c) { + } config_set_numerical_field( + "active-defrag-threshold-upper",server.active_defrag_threshold_upper,0,1000) { + } config_set_memory_field( +- "active-defrag-ignore-bytes",server.active_defrag_ignore_bytes) { ++ "active-defrag-ignore-bytes",server.active_defrag_ignore_bytes,0,LONG_MAX) { + } config_set_numerical_field( + "active-defrag-cycle-min",server.active_defrag_cycle_min,1,99) { + } config_set_numerical_field( +@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ void configSetCommand(client *c) { + + /* Memory fields. + * config_set_memory_field(name,var) */ +- } config_set_memory_field("maxmemory",server.maxmemory) { ++ } config_set_memory_field("maxmemory",server.maxmemory,0,LONG_MAX) { + if (server.maxmemory) { + if (server.maxmemory < zmalloc_used_memory()) { + serverLog(LL_WARNING,"WARNING: the new maxmemory value set via CONFIG SET is smaller than the current memory usage. This will result in keys eviction and/or inability to accept new write commands depending on the maxmemory-policy."); +@@ -1147,12 +1147,12 @@ void configSetCommand(client *c) { + freeMemoryIfNeeded(); + } + } config_set_memory_field( +- "proto-max-bulk-len",server.proto_max_bulk_len) { ++ "proto-max-bulk-len",server.proto_max_bulk_len,1024*1024,LONG_MAX/2) { + } config_set_memory_field( +- "client-query-buffer-limit",server.client_max_querybuf_len) { +- } config_set_memory_field("repl-backlog-size",ll) { ++ "client-query-buffer-limit",server.client_max_querybuf_len,0,LONG_MAX) { ++ } config_set_memory_field("repl-backlog-size",ll,0,LONG_MAX) { + resizeReplicationBacklog(ll); +- } config_set_memory_field("auto-aof-rewrite-min-size",ll) { ++ } config_set_memory_field("auto-aof-rewrite-min-size",ll,0,LONG_MAX) { + server.aof_rewrite_min_size = ll; + + /* Enumeration fields. +diff --git a/src/sds.c b/src/sds.c +index cd60946bdd3..12c9da356d9 100644 +--- a/src/sds.c ++++ b/src/sds.c +@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ sds sdsnewlen(const void *init, size_t initlen) { + int hdrlen = sdsHdrSize(type); + unsigned char *fp; /* flags pointer. */ + ++ assert(hdrlen+initlen+1 > initlen); /* Catch size_t overflow */ + sh = s_malloc(hdrlen+initlen+1); + if (!init) + memset(sh, 0, hdrlen+initlen+1); +@@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) { + len = sdslen(s); + sh = (char*)s-sdsHdrSize(oldtype); + newlen = (len+addlen); ++ assert(newlen > len); /* Catch size_t overflow */ + if (newlen < SDS_MAX_PREALLOC) + newlen *= 2; + else +@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ sds sdsMakeRoomFor(sds s, size_t addlen) { + if (type == SDS_TYPE_5) type = SDS_TYPE_8; + + hdrlen = sdsHdrSize(type); ++ assert(hdrlen+newlen+1 > len); /* Catch size_t overflow */ + if (oldtype==type) { + newsh = s_realloc(sh, hdrlen+newlen+1); + if (newsh == NULL) return NULL; +diff --git a/src/zmalloc.c b/src/zmalloc.c +index 972db79d7ab..29e68180f0d 100644 +--- a/src/zmalloc.c ++++ b/src/zmalloc.c +@@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ void zlibc_free(void *ptr) { + #endif + #endif + ++#if PREFIX_SIZE > 0 ++#define ASSERT_NO_SIZE_OVERFLOW(sz) assert((sz) + PREFIX_SIZE > (sz)) ++#else ++#define ASSERT_NO_SIZE_OVERFLOW(sz) ++#endif ++ + /* Explicitly override malloc/free etc when using tcmalloc. */ + #if defined(USE_TCMALLOC) + #define malloc(size) tc_malloc(size) +@@ -95,6 +101,7 @@ static void zmalloc_default_oom(size_t size) { + static void (*zmalloc_oom_handler)(size_t) = zmalloc_default_oom; + + void *zmalloc(size_t size) { ++ ASSERT_NO_SIZE_OVERFLOW(size); + void *ptr = malloc(size+PREFIX_SIZE); + + if (!ptr) zmalloc_oom_handler(size); +@@ -113,6 +120,7 @@ void *zmalloc(size_t size) { + * Currently implemented only for jemalloc. Used for online defragmentation. */ + #ifdef HAVE_DEFRAG + void *zmalloc_no_tcache(size_t size) { ++ ASSERT_NO_SIZE_OVERFLOW(size); + void *ptr = mallocx(size+PREFIX_SIZE, MALLOCX_TCACHE_NONE); + if (!ptr) zmalloc_oom_handler(size); + update_zmalloc_stat_alloc(zmalloc_size(ptr)); +@@ -127,6 +135,7 @@ void zfree_no_tcache(void *ptr) { + #endif + + void *zcalloc(size_t size) { ++ ASSERT_NO_SIZE_OVERFLOW(size); + void *ptr = calloc(1, size+PREFIX_SIZE); + + if (!ptr) zmalloc_oom_handler(size); +@@ -141,6 +150,7 @@ void *zcalloc(size_t size) { + } + + void *zrealloc(void *ptr, size_t size) { ++ ASSERT_NO_SIZE_OVERFLOW(size); + #ifndef HAVE_MALLOC_SIZE + void *realptr; + #endif |